Shedding Zmiy is an Eastern European, pro-state threat group active against Russian organizations since at least 2022. It is associated with the ExCobalt activity cluster and cyberespionage operations targeting government, metallurgy, mining, telecommunications, information technology, and software development organizations. No specific country of origin or sponsoring government has been established. The group exploits internet-facing applications and abuses contractor relationships to compromise target environments. In one intrusion through a contractor, it exploited Log4j vulnerabilities CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021-45105 in YouTrack before compromising Microsoft Exchange and stealing ASP.NET VIEWSTATE validation and decryption keys. Its custom Python framework BADSTATE uses these keys to deliver malicious serialized VIEWSTATE payloads and load the ViewStateExecutor .NET web shell into IIS worker-process memory. The framework supports reconnaissance, command execution, file transfer and manipulation, and in-memory execution of additional .NET assemblies. It can also deploy virtual web shells through ASP.NET VirtualPathProvider without creating corresponding web-shell files on disk, including tunnels using Neo-reGeorg. Associated ExCobalt operations use the GoRed backdoor, also reported as Bulldog Backdoor in Shedding Zmiy investigations. GoRed provides credential monitoring, host and network reconnaissance, encrypted command-and-control, reverse shells, proxying, filesystem monitoring, persistence, and data exfiltration. The associated toolset includes privilege-escalation exploits, credential-dumping utilities, remote-access tools, and web shells. Defense-evasion techniques include obfuscation, in-memory payload execution, and modified Linux utilities that conceal malicious processes and network connections. Tool and infrastructure overlaps with other Russia-targeting groups do not establish that those groups are aliases or subgroups of Shedding Zmiy.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
3 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
Начальным вектором атаки Shedding Zmiy была эксплуатация уязвимости Log4j (CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046 и CVE-2021-45105) в системе управления проектами YouTrack.
Начальным вектором атаки Shedding Zmiy была эксплуатация уязвимости Log4j (CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046 и CVE-2021-45105) в системе управления проектами YouTrack.
Начальным вектором атаки Shedding Zmiy была эксплуатация уязвимости Log4j (CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046 и CVE-2021-45105) в системе управления проектами YouTrack.
19 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Group associated with the (Ex)Cobalt cluster and linked here through overlap with Crypt Ghouls in DLL sideloading, CobInt, resocks, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and VDSina-hosted C2 infrastructure.
Referenced as a separate group (aka ExCobalt) conducting similar recent campaigns targeting Russia with overlapping tools/infrastructure; no additional details provided in the content.
Activity cluster whose reporting correlates with ExCobalt. A cited case describes the same attack and a GoRed sample communicating with pkg.collect.net.in, designated Bulldog Backdoor in that report. The article does not explicitly establish actor-name equivalence.
An Eastern European pro-government group attacking Russian organizations since at least 2022. The reported attack began with Log4j exploitation in YouTrack, followed by compromise of an Exchange server and theft of ASP.NET VIEWSTATE validation and decryption keys. The group uses its custom BADSTATE framework to exploit VIEWSTATE deserialization and operate memory-resident web shells on IIS servers, prioritizing Exchange. Its tooling supports remote command execution, file transfer, system discovery, and in-memory .NET assembly execution. No specific sponsoring state is identified.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.