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Mad Ghost is a pro-Iranian, anti-Israel hacktivist persona active in the cyber operations ecosystem surrounding the March 2026 Iran-Israel-US conflict. It appeared in coordination with the DieNet operational cluster and the broader Cyber Islamic Resistance-aligned campaign environment, where smaller channels and operators amplified one another’s claims and participated in synchronized disruptive activity. Mad Ghost was observed forwarding attack claims from allied channels and participating in coordinated operations rather than being documented as an independent, technically distinctive intrusion actor. The group has been associated with claimed attacks against Israeli telecommunications infrastructure, including mobile core network elements, and with participation in operations targeting Bahraini government infrastructure. In the documented campaign context, Mad Ghost functioned as an amplification and coordination node within DieNet-linked activity, helping circulate claims and support broader hacktivist messaging. The surrounding ecosystem relied heavily on disruptive operations, especially distributed denial-of-service activity, propaganda, and symbolic targeting timed to geopolitical events. Available evidence does not support attributing advanced bespoke malware development, verified ransomware operations, or confirmed destructive intrusions specifically to Mad Ghost. Its observed role is more consistent with hacktivist coordination, claim propagation, and participation in politically motivated disruptive campaigns aligned with pro-Iranian objectives.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
1 distinct technique observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Hacktivist group participating in DieNet-coordinated attacks against Bahraini government infrastructure, primarily in amplification and coordination roles.
Smaller hacktivist group that used DieNet’s infrastructure to launch attacks during the March 2026 campaign.
Channel used to amplify technically detailed telecom and infrastructure attack claims, including alleged attacks on Israeli mobile core infrastructure.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
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Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.