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The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) is Russia’s principal domestic security and counterintelligence service and has also played a significant role in the country’s external cyber operations. In cybersecurity reporting, FSB-linked intrusion activity has been associated with aliases including Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Dragonfly, Crouching Yeti, Koala, TeamSpy, and Havex. In the early post-Soviet period, the FSB was assessed to hold the leading role in Russian external cyber operations and to have developed relationships with independent Russian hackers and technical specialists to support those operations. FSB-linked cyber activity has been tied to long-running intrusions against U.S. and international energy-sector organizations, including campaigns active from at least 2011 through 2018. These operations used spearphishing, watering-hole compromises, and supply-chain compromises, including trojanized software updates, to gain initial access and harvest credentials. FSB-linked operators then established remote access, conducted reconnaissance inside victim environments, enumerated industrial control system assets, moved laterally, maintained persistence, and exfiltrated enterprise and ICS-related information such as architecture and layout data. Havex, a remote access trojan associated with this activity, was used to collect host and network information and to enumerate OPC-connected control-system devices. The actor’s targeting has prominently included the energy sector, particularly organizations in the United States and other international environments connected to industrial control systems and critical infrastructure. Reported tradecraft demonstrates capabilities spanning initial access, credential theft, reconnaissance, persistence, lateral movement, post-exploitation, and exfiltration. Beyond cyber operations, the FSB has been implicated by UK authorities in the assassination of former officer Alexander Litvinenko, with the 2016 inquiry concluding there was a strong probability that the FSB directed the operation. This reflects the organization’s broader role as a Russian state security service engaged in intelligence, counterintelligence, and coercive state activity. The FSB is a Russian state actor. Its cyber operations are best characterized as state-directed intelligence collection and strategic access activity aligned with Russian national security objectives.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
4 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
5 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Russian security service alleged in the article to have been involved in supplying hacked Democratic Party emails to WikiLeaks.
Implicated in directing the Litvinenko poisoning operation.
Historically led Russia’s early external cyber operations, leveraging unofficial hackers and technical institutes to support offensive cyber capability before the GRU rose to prominence.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.