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TeamSpy, also known as the TeamSpy crew, is a Russian-associated cyberespionage actor active since at least 2008. Its targets include government organizations, political targets, human rights activists, energy businesses, heavy-industry manufacturers, and other private companies. Operations have primarily affected Russia, Ukraine, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern Europe, with additional victims in Western countries and the Middle East. The operators’ identities and specific state sponsorship have not been conclusively established. TeamSpy combines legitimate, digitally signed TeamViewer software with DLL hijacking and custom surveillance utilities to obtain covert remote access. Its tooling suppresses visible notifications and system-tray indicators, establishes persistence, modifies firewall allowances, and detects analysis-related processes. Initial-access methods include watering-hole compromises, malicious advertising, redirects to exploit kits, malicious PDFs, and Java exploitation, including CVE-2012-0507. The actor collects TeamViewer credentials, keystrokes, clipboard contents, screenshots, host information, and listings of sensitive files. It uses both the commercial Ardamax keylogger and custom collection modules, enumerates network servers and shares, and employs utilities supporting lateral movement. Compromised-system data is staged and exfiltrated, while stolen TeamViewer credentials enable operators to reconnect silently to available victims. Its remote-access tooling also supports file transfers and covert webcam or microphone activation.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
24 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
19 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
14 additional families tracked in Mallory.
6 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 6 of them exploited in the wild.
More recently, the APT actor enumerated and exploited a Fortinet VPN vulnerability (CVE-2018-13379) for Initial Access and a Windows Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory (AD) servers for Privilege Escalation within the network.
The 2012 version of “door.jar” (CVE-2012-0507) exploit is blocked proactively by our AEP functionality at runtime and detected by Kaspersky products as “HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-0507.gen”.
More recently, the APT actor enumerated and exploited a Fortinet VPN vulnerability (CVE-2018-13379) for Initial Access.
The APT actor has been observed using Cisco AnyConnect Secure Socket Layer (SSL) virtual private network (VPN) connections to enable remote logins on at least one victim network, possibly enabled by an Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) vulnerability (CVE 2019-10149).
The APT actor scanned for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services and identified vulnerable systems, likely for future exploitation. This actor continues to exploit a Citrix Directory Traversal Bug (CVE-2019-19781) and a Microsoft Exchange remote code execution flaw (CVE-2020-0688).
1 more CVE tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
73 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as the likely identity of SIG39 based on registry IoCs and prior public reporting.
Named as an FSB-associated hacking designation in the report; specific operations are not detailed beyond broader FSB offensive and intelligence activity.
A cyberespionage and surveillance group active at least since 2008, with infrastructure potentially dating to 2004. It targeted government organizations, private companies, human rights activists, energy organizations and heavy industry, principally across the CIS and Eastern Europe. It combined covertly modified TeamViewer installations, custom collection modules and commercial keyloggers with watering-hole attacks and exploit kits. Russian-language artifacts are extensive, but the report does not establish an origin country or state sponsor. Georgian-language filename searches suggest possible Georgian victims, rather than confirmed targeting.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.