Angry Likho
Angry Likho is an APT group monitored since 2023 and referred to by some vendors as Sticky Werewolf. Researchers classify it within the broader Likho malicious activity cluster because of strong similarities to Awaken Likho. The group conducts targeted attacks with compact infrastructure and a limited implant set, focusing on employees of large organizations, including government agencies and contractors. Based on telemetry and victimology, Angry Likho primarily targets organizations in Russia and Belarus, with hundreds of victims identified in Russia, several in Belarus, and additional incidental victims in other countries. Researchers inferred the operators are likely native Russian speakers because the bait files are written in fluent Russian. Angry Likho uses standardized spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments as its initial access vector. Observed lures included self-extracting archives and phishing archives containing malicious LNK files alongside legitimate bait documents. In a June 2024 case, the group distributed a payload as FrameworkSurvivor.exe, an NSIS self-extracting archive that unpacked files into the victim’s $INTERNET_CACHE folder, renamed a file to Helping.cmd, and executed it. The CMD stage was heavily obfuscated and launched a legitimate AutoIt interpreter with a compiled AutoIt script implementing the core malicious logic. That script performed anti-analysis checks for emulator and security research artifacts, delayed execution to evade detection, suppressed system error reporting via SetErrorMode, deleted itself from disk, generated an encrypted and packed payload, and attempted to inject it into a legitimate AutoIt process. Researchers recovered the final payload and identified it as the Lumma stealer. In this usage, Lumma collected system information, installed software data, cookies, usernames, passwords, banking card numbers, and connection logs, and targeted data from multiple browsers including Chrome, Chromium, Edge, Firefox, Waterfox, Brave, Vivaldi, Opera variants, and Kometa. It also stole data from Binance and Ethereum wallets, MetaMask browser extensions, authenticator applications, AnyDesk, and KeePass. Researchers recovered multiple command-and-control domains and, by pivoting on shared infrastructure, identified more than 60 related malicious implants. They also detected continued Angry Likho activity in June 2024 and additional payloads in January 2025, including Base64-encoded .NET payloads hidden in image files. Attribution to Angry Likho was made with high confidence based on shared implant structure, Russian-language bait themes, similarly obfuscated command files and AutoIt scripts, and overlapping tactics with prior campaigns and reporting from BI.ZONE and F6. Known aliases and related naming in the provided content: Sticky Werewolf; linked by researchers to the broader Likho cluster and noted as strongly resembling Awaken Likho.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Government & Administration
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇷🇺 Russia
- 🇧🇾 Belarus
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- RU
Tradecraft
18 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
Observables
56 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as a prominent threat actor group that has used the Lumma infostealer.
Targeted spear-phishing campaign against employees of large organizations, especially Russian government institutions and contractors, using self-extracting archives, obfuscated AutoIt-based implants, and Lumma stealer to steal credentials, banking data, and cryptowallet information.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.