Fatemiyoun Electronic Team is a pro-Iranian hacktivist or proxy cyber group publicly identified as a participant in the #OpIsrael campaign. The group has been named alongside Cyber Islamic Resistance (Team 313), NoName057(16), and Handala Group in coordinated or thematically aligned activity associated with pro-Iranian and pro-Russian online operations. Reported targeting in this campaign has included Israeli industrial control systems and government portals in Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain. Available reporting supports the group’s involvement in disruptive and influence-oriented cyber signaling, but does not provide high-confidence evidence of sophisticated standalone operations attributable specifically to this actor beyond participation in the broader campaign. Public claims surrounding #OpIsrael have been assessed by some analysts as frequently exaggerated or false, so attribution and operational impact should be treated cautiously. The actor is best characterized as part of an Iran-aligned hacktivist/proxy ecosystem engaged in politically motivated cyber activity connected to regional conflict dynamics.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
3 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Hacktivist/proxy participant in the #OpIsrael campaign reported to target Israeli industrial control systems and government portals across Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain.
Hacktivist/proxy participant in the #OpIsrael campaign; reported targeting includes Israeli industrial control systems and government portals, with spillover targeting across Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.