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UNC6671 is a financially motivated cybercrime activity cluster conducting corporate cloud-data theft and extortion campaigns. Also tracked as CORDIAL SPIDER, the cluster is associated with the BlackFile, Helix, Falcon, Pink, and Redact extortion brands. These brands do not necessarily represent a single organizational identity. Its targets include financial services organizations, hedge funds, private equity firms, law firms, technology companies, and enterprises in manufacturing, real estate, healthcare, insurance, transportation, and hospitality. Campaigns have targeted organizations in North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Operators impersonate internal IT helpdesk personnel through voice phishing, frequently contacting employees on personal mobile phones and sometimes spoofing legitimate helpdesk numbers. Urgent security-migration, passkey-enrollment, MFA-update, and SSO pretexts direct victims to organization-branded phishing portals. Adversary-in-the-middle infrastructure captures credentials, MFA approvals, and authenticated sessions; device-code phishing is another observed access technique. Compromised identities provide access to Microsoft 365, Okta-connected applications, and other enterprise SaaS resources. Post-compromise activity includes account and cloud-resource reconnaissance, attacker-controlled MFA enrollment, password resets for connected applications, and automated collection of email and documents. Operators systematically exfiltrate information from services including SharePoint Online, OneDrive, and Exchange Online. Residential proxies disguise access, while deletion of security notifications and password-reset messages conceals account abuse. Extortion relies on threats to publish stolen information, including through associated leak sites, rather than requiring encryption of victim systems. UNC6671 continued operating through multiple extortion brands after BlackFile's claimed retirement.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
138 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Uses phone-based social engineering and passkey-themed phishing infrastructure to compromise corporate identities and access enterprise cloud environments. Its activity has been linked to the same extortion ecosystem.
A contemporaneous vishing-led extortion activity cluster using adversary-in-the-middle credential harvesting and exfiltration from enterprise cloud environments. It is discussed as a comparison case; the content concludes that its infrastructure and target set are separate from those of the ShinyHunters-attributed domain campaign.
A data-extortion group assessed in the reference to have significant tradecraft similarities to PREY-0058.
Named activity cluster associated by the report with ShinyHunters activity.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.