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STAC4365 is a financially motivated ransomware affiliate tracked by Sophos and associated with Qilin ransomware. Its phishing activity has been linked to campaigns dating back to November 2022. The group targets managed service provider administrators to compromise ScreenConnect management access and reach multiple downstream customer environments. In a January 2025 campaign, STAC4365 impersonated ScreenConnect authentication alerts and used Evilginx adversary-in-the-middle phishing infrastructure to capture credentials, session cookies, and time-based one-time passwords. Lookalike login pages proxied legitimate authentication, enabling access to a ScreenConnect Cloud super-administrator account despite multifactor authentication. The phishing infrastructure used Amazon Simple Email Service tracking redirects and selective redirection to conceal malicious pages from unintended visitors. After compromising the administrator account, the group deployed an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect instance across customer environments. Subsequent activity included network and user discovery, credential resets, remote command execution, and lateral movement using ScreenConnect, PsExec, NetExec, and WinRM. The attackers also used tooling designed to exploit CVE-2023-27532 to retrieve credentials from Veeam configuration databases. They collected and compressed customer data with WinRAR and exfiltrated archives through a public file-sharing service using Chrome in Incognito mode. STAC4365 targeted backups, configured systems to boot into Safe Mode with networking, and deployed Qilin ransomware as part of double-extortion operations.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
10 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
26 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a publicly known Qilin affiliate. No incident-specific attribution, malware deployment details, or individual techniques are provided.
Conducted a ScreenConnect supply-chain compromise using evilginx adversary-in-the-middle phishing against managed-service-provider administrators, intercepting credentials and MFA TOTP codes to gain super-administrator access to downstream customer environments.
Named activity cluster associated with phishing infrastructure spoofing ScreenConnect since late 2022, using evilginx and tracking-link gating to harvest credentials and MFA tokens and enable downstream ransomware deployment.
Named activity cluster distributing Qilin through phishing emails impersonating ScreenConnect authentication alerts.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.