Loading threat actor…
Vect, also known as Vect Ransomware and Vect Ransomware Group, is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in late December 2025 and began claiming victims in January 2026. It recruits affiliates through Russian-language cybercrime forums and offers ransomware deployment and extortion infrastructure. Its victims span information technology, manufacturing, healthcare, education, energy, and financial services, with targeting documented in the United States, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Russian-language recruitment does not establish its country of origin. In late March 2026, Vect announced an operational partnership with TeamPCP, combining TeamPCP’s software supply-chain credential harvesting and data theft with Vect’s ransomware infrastructure. Vect uses compromised credentials to access downstream organizations, while TeamPCP supplies access derived from poisoned developer and security tooling, including the Trivy and LiteLLM campaigns. At least one verified Vect ransomware deployment used TeamPCP-sourced credentials. Vect also partnered with BreachForums to distribute affiliate access. Its double-extortion model combines file encryption with threatened publication of stolen data through a dedicated leak site. Vect’s analyzed Windows ransomware enumerates network resources, accepts Active Directory credentials, and supports lateral movement through WinRM, WMI, DCOM, scheduled tasks, services, and Group Policy. It disables security protections, terminates security, backup, and database processes, deletes shadow copies, and modifies Safe Mode settings to maintain execution. The locker uses ChaCha20-based intermittent encryption. Corroborated implementation flaws in its handling of encryption nonces can leave files larger than 128 KB irrecoverably damaged, even when the correct key is available. Consequently, its deployment can cause permanent data loss rather than reliably reversible encryption.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
50 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
27 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A ransomware-as-a-service group that reportedly received compromised credentials from TeamPCP for use in attacks.
Identified as a ransomware and extortion group claiming theft of 700 GB from Guesty and 250 GB from S&P Global. The article connects these extortion cases to credentials harvested during the TeamPCP LiteLLM/Trivy campaign. The stolen-data quantities and contents are attributed to Vect's claims; the article does not provide specific evidence of encryption or identify a deployed ransomware family.
Ransomware group partnered with TeamPCP to monetize stolen data and publish victims using access/data obtained by TeamPCP.
Ransomware and extortion actor associated with deploying ransomware using TeamPCP-sourced credentials and monetizing downstream access through extortion infrastructure.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.