UAC-0063, also tracked as TAG-110, is a Russia-aligned cyberespionage intrusion set targeting government bodies, diplomatic missions, educational organizations, and research institutions. Its operations have been documented since at least 2022, with a principal focus on Central Asia and subsequent activity across Europe. Known targets include organizations in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, as well as diplomatic missions in Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Romania, and Georgia. The group obtains initial access through spear-phishing, frequently using compromised email accounts and legitimate documents stolen from earlier victims. It weaponizes Microsoft Word documents with VBA macros and uses social engineering to encourage macro execution. Established infection chains deploy HATVIBE, an HTA-based loader and backdoor, followed by espionage implants. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks and malicious global templates that execute when Microsoft Word starts. In early 2025, a Tajikistan-focused campaign used macro-enabled Word templates without embedding the HATVIBE payload used in earlier campaigns. UAC-0063's malware portfolio includes DownEx, also known as STILLARCH; CHERRYSPY, also known as DownExPyer; HATVIBE; LOGPIE; and PyPlunderPlug. These tools support remote command execution, host reconnaissance, targeted file exfiltration, screenshot capture, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, and collection of files from removable media. The group has deployed both Python-based and compiled Cython implant variants and uses encoded or obfuscated payloads and modifications to Office security settings to hinder detection and facilitate execution. Its operations emphasize sustained access and intelligence collection rather than ransomware or extortion.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
31 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
Threat Actors (TAs) leveraging a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, identified as CVE-2023-38831, to deliver their payload on compromised systems... The aforementioned vulnerability allows the WinRAR application to extract and execute the malicious script when a user tries to open a benign file within the archive.
Слід додати, що в червні 2024 року зафіксовано численні випадки встановлення бекдору HATVIBE шляхом експлуатації вразливості (вірогідно, CVE-2024-23692) в програмному продукті HFS HTTP File Server
85 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as another threat actor previously active against Central Asia for comparison/background only.
A previously documented cyberespionage campaign targeting government and diplomatic organizations in Central Asia and Europe; cited as geopolitical background for SilkParasite.
Referenced as a separate Russia-linked cyber-espionage operation previously documented by Bitdefender as expanding from Central Asia into Europe.
Espionage-focused activity expanding to European embassies; uses stolen legitimate documents for follow-on targeting and delivers HATVIBE malware; also assessed in reporting as Russia-linked and potentially overlapping with APT28.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.