Snatch is a financially motivated ransomware and extortion operation, also referred to as Snatch Team. Active since at least 2018, it is known for opportunistic intrusions into enterprise environments, especially through exposed remote access services and weakly protected accounts. The group has been associated with affiliate-style recruitment and has sought partners with existing access to corporate networks via RDP, VNC, TeamViewer, web shells, and SQL injection. Snatch has also been linked to infrastructure overlap or operational relationships with other criminal actors in parts of the ransomware ecosystem. A defining characteristic of Snatch is its long-standing use of Windows Safe Mode boot abuse to impair endpoint defenses before encryption. The malware installs itself as a service capable of running in Safe Mode, modifies boot settings to force a reboot, and then encrypts files while many security products are inactive. Reported intrusions also involved deletion of shadow copies, use of legitimate administrative tools to disable protections, and deployment through PsExec. Beyond encryption, Snatch operators have conducted extensive reconnaissance, credential theft including LSASS dumping, internal discovery, lateral movement, persistence through remote access tooling and surveillance software, and exfiltration of victim data. Snatch is an early adopter of naming-and-shaming and double-extortion tactics. The group has operated a leak site, publicly exposed stolen data from non-paying victims, and at times presented itself as a data-leak platform willing to cooperate with other actors. Reporting has noted repeated overlap between Snatch and Nokoyawa victim disclosures and possible affiliate crossover with other ransomware programs, though such relationships are not fully resolved. Snatch has also used Linux variants in some attacks, indicating capability beyond Windows-only operations. Observed targeting has been broad and opportunistic, including organizations in the United States, Canada, Germany, and several European countries, as well as consulting and retail-related victims. The operation is best characterized as a criminal ransomware actor focused on monetizing network intrusions through encryption, stolen-data extortion, and public leak pressure.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
41 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
2 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as another ransomware group known for abusing Safe Mode.
Mentioned only as a comparative example of another ransomware group known to use Safe Mode tactics.
Named as one of multiple ransomware groups operating data leak sites and listing fresh victims.
Mentioned only as a historical example of a ransomware family known to use Safe Mode to impair defenses.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.