Twelve
Twelve is a hacktivist threat actor formed in April 2023 in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The group has primarily targeted Russian government organizations and other Russian entities, and is characterized in the reporting as destructive rather than profit-driven. Its stated pattern is to exfiltrate sensitive data, publicize compromises on Telegram, encrypt systems, and then deploy wiping functionality to maximize operational damage and hinder recovery. Observed Twelve intrusions commonly begin through valid local or domain accounts, or stolen VPN/SSH certificates, including access obtained by first compromising contractors and then using contractor certificates to reach customer VPNs. The group has also been linked to exploitation of VMware vSphere/vCenter vulnerabilities CVE-2021-21972 and CVE-2021-22005 to deploy PHP web shells and the FaceFish backdoor on vCenter servers. For command and control, persistence, and post-exploitation, Twelve has used largely public tooling including Cobalt Strike, mimikatz, chisel, BloodHound, PowerView, adPEAS, CrackMapExec, Advanced IP Scanner, PsExec, PowerShell, RDP, and ngrok. Reporting also describes PHP web shells in Bitrix-related directories, Active Directory manipulation via PowerShell and net.exe, scheduled tasks and Group Policy abuse for domain-wide malware deployment, and defense evasion through masquerading, event log clearing, and artifact cleanup. For credential access and reconnaissance, Twelve has used mimikatz, registry hive dumping, ntdsutil.exe, XenArmor All-In-One Password Recovery Pro, Advanced IP Scanner, BloodHound, adPEAS, and PowerView. For exfiltration, the group has collected financial documents, technical drawings, corporate email, and Telegram Desktop session data, archived data with 7z, and uploaded it to DropMeFiles before posting stolen information to its Telegram channel. For impact, Twelve has used LockBit 3.0 variants compiled from publicly available source code, as well as Chaos-based ransomware samples linked through static analysis. Reporting states the ransom notes lacked contact information and contained only the group logo, reinforcing the assessment that sabotage and reputational damage are prioritized over monetization. Twelve has also deployed Shamoon-like wipers compiled from public source code; these overwrite the MBR, recursively corrupt and delete files, self-delete, and shut down systems. Wipers and ransomware were distributed via netlogon shares, PowerShell, Group Policy, and scheduled tasks. Known aliases in the provided content are limited to Twelve. The reporting also notes overlaps in infrastructure, tooling, and TTPs with DARKSTAR, formerly known as Shadow or COMET, suggesting they may belong to the same syndicate or activity cluster, although DARKSTAR is described as following a classic double-extortion model while Twelve is framed as hacktivist. Additional reporting identifies substantial overlaps and likely cooperation or tool sharing between Twelve and other Russia-targeting clusters including Head Mare, Crypt Ghouls, MorLock, BlackJack, and Shedding Zmiy (aka ExCobalt).
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Energy
- Capital Goods
- Government & Administration
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇷🇺 Russia
Tradecraft
42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
19 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
14 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
An incident we investigated involved the FaceFish backdoor, loaded with the help of a web shell installed on a VMware vCenter server by exploiting the CVE-2021-21972 and CVE-2021-22005 vulnerabilities in the vSphere virtualization platform. The former vulnerability can be found in the platform’s client and allows remote code execution.
An incident we investigated involved the FaceFish backdoor, loaded with the help of a web shell installed on a VMware vCenter server by exploiting the CVE-2021-21972 and CVE-2021-22005 vulnerabilities in the vSphere virtualization platform. ... the latter is an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the server.
Observables
47 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Group linked by overlap with Crypt Ghouls through use of XenAllPasswordPro and the Intellpui.vbs loader for CobInt.
Hacktivist destructive operations against Russian government organizations, combining data theft, ransomware-style encryption, and wiper deployment to maximize disruption rather than pursue ransom payments.
Activity cluster whose tooling/C2 overlaps with Head Mare in operations targeting Russian entities.
Referenced as a related ransomware intrusion cluster with shared utilities and possible infrastructure overlap with Crypt Ghouls.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.