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Z-Pentest is a pro-Russian, pro-Kremlin hacktivist group associated with disruptive and intrusion-focused activity against critical infrastructure. It has ties to the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) ecosystem and has been identified by European authorities as linked to the Russian state. The group emerged in late 2024 amid fragmentation of earlier pro-Russian hacktivist networks and shifted beyond propaganda and denial-of-service activity toward operational-technology targeting. Danish authorities attributed a destructive December 2024 cyberattack against Tureby Alkestrup Waterworks to Z-Pentest. Attackers altered water pressure, causing a pipe rupture and temporary loss of water service. Z-Pentest has also been associated with targeting water and energy utilities in Western countries and with claimed access to industrial environments in Germany, Italy, and Poland, including defense suppliers, heavy industry, and food-processing organizations. Its observed and reported tradecraft includes reconnaissance of internet-exposed industrial systems and remote-management interfaces, credential stuffing, password spraying, use of default or reused credentials, and abuse of compromised authentication to access HMIs and other OT interfaces. Such access can enable manipulation of industrial parameters or alarms. The group has been linked to CARR and other companion groups that coordinate through pro-Russian hacktivist channels. European Union sanctions identified Yuliya Pankratova as Z-Pentest’s leader and Denis Degtyarenko as its chief hacker.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Reportedly conducted a destructive cyberattack against a Danish water utility in 2024.
Third-party pro-Russian hacktivist group to which BLACKNET-00 reportedly offered its tools.
Russian hacktivist group connected to earlier ICS/SCADA tooling context and directly solicited as a prospective TRK-25 purchaser. No completed sale or deployment is established.
Pro-Russian hacking group known for targeting critical infrastructure.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.