APT19
APT19 is a threat actor also referred to in the provided content as Deep Panda, Black Vine, Codoso/Codoso Team, Checkered Typhoon, ATG50, C0d0so0, Chlorine, G0073, KungFu Kittens, PinkPanther, Red Gargoyle, Shell Crew, Sunshop Group, TG-3551, and Webmasters. The content describes APT19 as using spearphishing attachments to attempt to get users to launch malicious files, and as using PowerShell for execution, including concealed execution with -W Hidden or -w hidden. Deep Panda is specifically described as using PowerShell scripts to download and execute programs in memory without writing to disk, and as using the Microsoft Tasklist utility to list running processes. The content also states that APT19 downloaded and launched code within an SCT file. For persistence, the content states that an APT19 HTTP malware variant established persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%, and that an APT19 Port 22 malware variant registered itself as a service. For command and control, the content states that APT19 used HTTP, including an HTTP malware variant that communicated over HTTP for C2 and used Base64-encoded communications. The content also notes that an APT19 HTTP malware variant decrypted strings using single-byte XOR keys. For host and user discovery, the content states that APT19 used HTTP and Port 22 malware variants to collect the victim username, and to collect the MAC address and IP address from the victim machine. The ATT&CK-style annotations in the content associate APT19 with PowerShell execution, command and scripting interpreter use, exploitation of public-facing applications, and data from local system collection. The content also notes that APT19 has been observed deploying Cobalt Strike in campaigns where legitimate simulation tooling was used as actual malware.
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Tradecraft
48 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
15 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
10 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
6 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 6 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
FireEye recently identified another targeted attack campaign that leveraged both the recently announced Internet Explorer zero-day, CVE-2013-1347, as well as recently patched Java exploits CVE-2013-2423 and CVE-2013-1493. ... If a visitor to one of these compromised website was running Internet Explorer 8.0 the malicious javascript would redirect them to a page at www[.]sunshop[.]com[.]tw hosting a CVE-2013-1347 exploit. ... The Internet Explorer (CVE-2013-1347) exploit code pulled down a “9002” RAT from another compromised site at hk[.]sz181[.]com.
The second jar file had a MD5 of 3fbb7321d8610c6e2d990bb25ce34bec and exploited CVE-2013-1493. ... The jar that exploited CVE-2013-1493 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of 42bd5e7e8f74c15873ff0f4a9ce974cd. ... The exploit site at sunshop[.]com[.]tw previously hosted a different malicious jar file on April 2, 2013. This jar file had a MD5 of 51aff823274e9d12b1a9a4bbbaf8ce00. It exploited CVE-2013-1493 and dropped a Poison Ivy RAT.
The java exploits were packaged as two different jar files. One jar file had a MD5 of f4bee1e845137531f18c226d118e06d7 and exploited CVE-2013-2423. The jar that exploited CVE-2013-2423 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of d99ed31af1e0ad6fb5bf0f116063e91f. This RAT connected to a command and control server at asp[.]homesvr[.]linkpc[.]net.
It is our hypothesis that these legitimate compromised sites were all compromised sometime after early November using CVE-2015-7501 [7,8] and publicly available exploit code [9].
1 more CVE tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
203 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.