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Rocket Kitten, also known as Ajax Security Team, Flying Kitten, Operation Saffron Rose, Operation Woolen Goldfish, and Ajaxtm, is an Iran-linked threat group active since at least 2010. The group initially engaged in website defacement before shifting to malware-enabled cyber espionage by 2014. Reporting has linked the activity to Iranian operators and assessed it as aligned with Iranian state interests. Rocket Kitten has targeted public and private organizations in Israel and Europe, including government, defense, academic, information technology, and civilian entities. Additional targeting has included the U.S. defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies. The group is known for spearphishing-led intrusions that rely on personalized lures, malicious attachments, and user execution. In Operation Woolen Goldfish, it used malicious Microsoft Office documents with embedded macros to deliver GHOLE/Gholee malware, later evolving to hosted second-stage payload delivery and decoy-document execution chains. The actor has also used custom malware families including Wrapper/Gholee, FireMalv, and CWoolger. Observed capabilities include downloading additional malware to compromised systems, stealing browser-stored credentials from Firefox, and keylogging. CWoolger has been used to capture keystrokes and maintain persistence on infected hosts. The group has been described as less technically sophisticated than some top-tier state-backed actors, but persistent, adaptive, and effective in social-engineering-driven espionage operations. Recurrent aliases and handles associated with the activity include Wool3n.H4t, which has been linked in reporting to malware development and campaign operations.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
29 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
4 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
73 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an associated threat actor in detection annotations for Ghostscript exploitation; no specific campaign activity is described in this reference.
Referenced as a named APT group in the context of prior threat research produced by Gadi Evron; no operational details are provided in the content.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the malicious file execution technique detected by this analytic.
Listed in the detection annotations as a threat actor associated with EFI volume mounting / installation-related behavior.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.