XENOTIME, also known as TEMP.Veles, is a Russia-associated threat actor targeting industrial environments, including petrochemical facilities and electric utilities. The group was responsible for the 2017 Triton/Trisis malware attack against a Saudi Arabian petrochemical plant. In 2019, it expanded its targeting to electric utilities in the United States and the Asia-Pacific region. XENOTIME uses compromised VPN accounts to access victim environments and VPN connections to maintain persistence. Its post-compromise tradecraft includes credential harvesting with Mimikatz and the custom tool SecHack, use of PsExec and RDP, deployment of web shells on Microsoft Exchange servers, and scheduled-task XML triggers. It also uses the PowerShell-based tool WMImplant. Defense-evasion practices include PowerShell-based timestomping, deletion of tools and logs after use, and disguising malicious files as legitimate Windows update or Schneider Electric application components.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
28 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
9 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
4 additional families tracked in Mallory.
10 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an annotated threat actor associated with the Socat detection; no actor-specific activity is described.
Included only as an annotated threat-actor association; no actor-specific activity is described.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.