ALLANITE, also known as Palmetto Fusion and Allanite, is a Dragos-tracked industrial control systems (ICS) intrusion activity group focused on electric utility and other industrial infrastructure environments. The group has been observed targeting enterprise and operational technology networks in the United States and United Kingdom electric utility sectors, as well as German industrial infrastructure. Its activity is characterized primarily by reconnaissance and information gathering in operational environments, indicating an apparent objective of developing access and situational awareness that could support later disruptive operations. ALLANITE has been associated with watering-hole operations and credential harvesting used for initial access. Reported tradecraft includes phishing and watering-hole attacks leading to ICS reconnaissance and screenshot collection, as well as abuse of captured credentials and built-in administrative tools after compromise. The group has also been noted among ICS-targeting actors that attempt to exploit remote access technology and logon infrastructure. In Germany, ALLANITE activity included credential harvesting via watering holes followed by intrusion into electric-sector environments, with possible additional interest in water and wastewater organizations. The group is notable for its focus on business and ICS networks rather than publicly demonstrated disruptive malware or confirmed destructive effects. Nevertheless, its reconnaissance in OT environments and repeated targeting of critical infrastructure place it among the more significant threats to industrial operators. ALLANITE has also been linked to watering-hole activity involving websites associated with Ukrainian sports, entertainment, and media entities, consistent with broader information-gathering and credential-collection operations. Available reporting supports assessment of ALLANITE as an espionage-oriented ICS threat actor with strong interest in electric-sector operational environments and the potential to stage future disruptive events.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
9 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a named threat actor in source data associated with the win.raccoon entry.
Listed as a newly associated actor for the win.arkei_stealer malware family.
Named threat actor listed in the reference; appears as an alias cluster entry and is also mentioned in the win.buer actor line.
Named threat actor/cluster appearing in the actor list associated with the win.metamorfo content.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.