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APT3 is a China-linked cyberespionage group also known as Pirpi, Buckeye, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, Boron, Brocade Typhoon, Cybran, OldCarp, Red Sylvan, TG-0110, and Threat Group-0110. Its targeting includes the United States, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and other countries in Europe and Asia. The group gains initial access through spearphishing emails containing malicious links and zero-day exploitation of Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Adobe Flash Player. It deploys custom implants and downloaders, including downloaders that establish SOCKS5 connections for initial command-and-control communications. Its exploitation and evasion techniques include return-oriented programming chains to bypass ASLR and DEP, RC4 encryption, file and information obfuscation, and changes to command-and-control infrastructure. After compromise, APT3 discovers remote systems, executes local and remote commands, and steals credentials using a tool that injects into the Windows Local Security Authority process. It creates or enables local accounts and adds created accounts to local administrator groups to preserve elevated access. Persistence mechanisms include Windows services, scheduled tasks configured to execute at user logon under the SYSTEM account, and enabling Remote Desktop Protocol. The group also uses interactive remote desktop sessions to browse and copy files on compromised systems and compresses collected data before exfiltration.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
17 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
12 additional families tracked in Mallory.
4 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 4 of them exploited in the wild.
the most recent original zero-day released by this group is tracked by CVE-2015-3113, which has similarities to the once zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2014-1776 and CVE-2014-6332 exploited by UPS in May and November 2014, respectively.
Unit 42 recently analyzed malicious Flash files that exploited CVE-2015-3113, which was a zero-day vulnerability in Adobe Flash that was patched on June 23, 2015.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
the most recent original zero-day released by this group is tracked by CVE-2015-3113, which has similarities to the once zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2014-1776 and CVE-2014-6332 exploited by UPS in May and November 2014, respectively.
91 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed only in technique annotations. The content does not attribute ResetNightmare exploitation or a specific campaign to this group.
Referenced only as an annotated actor associated with the detection technique.
Listed in the detection annotation metadata.
Referenced solely as an ATT&CK-associated group for Windows built-in account renaming/local-account abuse; no campaign or activity is described.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.