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FIN8 is a financially motivated cybercrime intrusion set known for targeted enterprise intrusions, historically including attacks against payment-processing environments and later activity associated with ransomware-linked operations. The group is also tracked as Syssphinx and has been referred to as Storm-0288. FIN8 commonly relies on spearphishing emails carrying malicious attachments, including macro-enabled Word documents, to obtain initial access. Its payloads have been executed through PowerShell, and the group has used PowerShell extensively for follow-on activity including credential access and lateral movement. Observed FIN8 tradecraft includes downloading additional payloads through remote code execution, maintaining access with scheduled tasks, using RDP backdoors for persistence, and communicating over HTTPS for command and control. The group has demonstrated defense-evasion and anti-forensics behavior, including deleting temporary and prefetch files and removing Registry artifacts during post-compromise cleanup. FIN8 has also used Registry-based checks to identify potential sandbox environments before executing malware. Reporting has additionally associated FIN8-linked activity with Badhatch, an F5 backdoor, and possible links to the White Rabbit ransomware operation, though the exact relationship between FIN8 and White Rabbit has not been established with high confidence. FIN8 has been observed performing credential access, lateral movement, privilege escalation, remote command execution, and post-exploitation cleanup. The group has also been linked to token impersonation or token theft techniques in the wild. Overall, FIN8 is best characterized as a financially motivated intrusion set that combines phishing-led initial access with hands-on post-compromise activity, PowerShell-heavy tradecraft, persistence via scheduled tasks, and deliberate efforts to evade detection and remove forensic evidence.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
37 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
18 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
13 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
FIN8 has exploited the CVE-2016-0167 local vulnerability.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The following analytic detects when su runs from a page-cache-corrupted binary... This activity is significant because it indicates a possible privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to gain root access... CVE CVE-2026-31431 ... References ... copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431
25 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the generic installation exploitation analytic, but no campaign-specific activity is described in this reference.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Mentioned only as an annotation/tag associated with a privilege escalation detection.
Mentioned only as an annotated threat actor associated with the detection content; no campaign or activity by the group is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.