FIN8, also known as STORM-0288 and Syssphinx, is a financially motivated threat group active since at least January 2016. It is historically associated with payment-card theft from point-of-sale systems in retail, hospitality, and entertainment organizations. Its victims also include financial institutions, insurers, technology companies, and chemical companies. Documented targeting spans the United States, Canada, Italy, South Africa, Panama, and Puerto Rico. FIN8 uses targeted spearphishing emails containing malicious macro-enabled documents or links to those documents. It has exploited Windows vulnerabilities, including CVE-2016-0167 for local privilege escalation. Following compromise, the group enumerates hosts, domain controllers, privileged accounts, and domain relationships using Active Directory utilities and native Windows commands. It harvests credentials with Invoke-Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor, abuses valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement, and moves through networks using RDP, WMI, and Impacket's WMIExec and SMBExec tools. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks maintaining RDP backdoors and WMI event subscriptions. Collected data has been compressed with RAR before exfiltration. The group's backdoor arsenal includes BADHATCH and Sardonic. BADHATCH supports reconnaissance, command execution, file transfer, screenshots, proxy tunneling, token impersonation, and credential-based lateral movement, including pass-the-hash functionality. Sardonic supports system-information collection, shell-command execution, and dynamically loaded DLL plugins executed in memory. FIN8 deploys these tools through multistage PowerShell, .NET, and shellcode execution chains, using in-memory loading and process injection. Its defense-evasion techniques include encrypted or encoded payloads, obfuscated macros and command-line arguments, disguised command-and-control requests, and automated post-compromise cleanup.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
44 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
21 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
16 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
FIN8 has exploited the CVE-2016-0167 local vulnerability.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The following analytic detects when su runs from a page-cache-corrupted binary... This activity is significant because it indicates a possible privilege escalation attempt, allowing a user to gain root access... CVE CVE-2026-31431 ... References ... copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431
75 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed in the detection's technique annotations; the content does not attribute ShieldCrash exploitation to this group.
Referenced only as an annotated actor associated with the detection technique.
Listed in the detection annotation metadata.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.