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OilRig is an Iranian state-sponsored cyberespionage threat actor also tracked as APT34, Cobalt Gypsy, Crambus, Earth Simnavaz, Europium, Evasive Serpens, Hazel Sandstorm, Helix Kitten, IRN2, ITG13, and TA452. Its operations combine targeted phishing, credential theft, custom malware, and abuse of legitimate remote-access services to compromise and retain access to victim environments. OilRig sends spearphishing messages containing malicious links or attachments, including messages sent from compromised or spoofed email accounts. It uses malicious document macros to deliver malware such as QUADAGENT and OopsIE, and employs PowerShell, batch scripts, and VBScript for payload execution. Its concealment techniques include encrypting and Base64-encoding malware data, decoding payloads with PowerShell or certutil, and disguising malicious executables as documents. The group uses Mimikatz and LaZagne to steal credentials associated with logged-in accounts and Outlook Web Access. Compromised credentials support access to additional systems, while Remote Desktop Protocol and tunneling tools facilitate lateral movement. OilRig maintains access through web shells, scheduled tasks that execute malicious scripts, and remote services including VPNs, Citrix, and Outlook Web Access.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
78 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
61 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
56 additional families tracked in Mallory.
16 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 16 of them exploited in the wild.
Recent campaigns have demonstrated APT34's ability to exploit vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-30088 for privilege escalation, enabling them to escalate its access within compromised networks.
Clearsky has detected new and advanced attack vector used by MuddyWater to target governmental entities and the telecommunication sector. Notably, the TTP includes decoy documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 as the first stage of the attack.
Less than a week after Microsoft issued a patch for CVE-2017-11882, FireEye observed an attacker using an exploit for the Microsoft Office vulnerability to target a government organization in the Middle East.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability (CVSS 9.8, critical) described as an unauthenticated RCE; the content says it is in CISA KEV, was used by APT34, and is associated with ransomware. The article explicitly states it is not connected to Screening Serpens.
11 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
720 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The broader group proposed as an organizational home for UNC5795 and UNC5187. Their placement is tentative and assessed with medium confidence; precise organizational structure remains unresolved. The report cites Iraqi government targeting and government-themed social engineering as consistent with previously documented APT34 operations. TAG-135 is explicitly identified in supporting research as an APT34 subcluster.
Listed in the detection's technique annotations; the content does not attribute ShieldCrash exploitation to this group.
Iranian-linked group mentioned as a possible—but unconfirmed—threat relevant to the compromise of U.S. military personnel information.
Annotation-only mention; no actor-specific operation or behavior is described.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.