Pay2Key is an Iran-linked ransomware operation first observed in 2020 and widely associated with Iranian state interests. Multiple assessments have linked the operation to the Iranian threat actor Fox Kitten, also known as UNC757, and described Pay2Key as part of a broader pattern in which Tehran-aligned operators blend espionage, disruption, and criminal-style ransomware tradecraft. The group initially became known for ransomware and leak operations against Israeli organizations, including hack-and-leak and supply-chain activity, and later re-emerged as a ransomware-as-a-service operation recruiting affiliates on criminal forums while explicitly incentivizing attacks aligned with Iranian geopolitical objectives, particularly against Israel and the United States. Pay2Key has targeted organizations in Israel and the United States, with reporting also indicating targeting of organizations in Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates. Observed victim sectors include government-related entities, healthcare, industrial and logistics companies, insurance, and technology organizations. The operation has been characterized as pursuing strategic disruption and information theft in addition to ransom revenue, and some incidents have appeared more destructive than financially motivated. Historically, Pay2Key operations involved exploitation of internet-facing systems and remote access infrastructure, including known vulnerabilities in VPN and edge appliances, as well as RDP exposure and brute-force activity. Reported post-compromise behavior includes establishing persistence and reverse-proxy access, use of legitimate remote administration software for interactive access, credential theft with tools such as Mimikatz and LaZagne, Active Directory interaction, network discovery, lateral movement, backup-system enumeration, defense evasion, anti-forensics, and log clearing. The group has used stolen-data leak sites to pressure victims and has also been linked to supply-chain compromise activity. Recent reporting describes enhanced evasion, execution, and anti-forensics capabilities, including disabling endpoint protections, inhibiting recovery, and rapidly encrypting enterprise environments. Pay2Key has also expanded beyond Windows with a Linux variant targeting servers, virtualization hosts, and cloud workloads, using privileged execution, service and process termination, security-control disablement, persistence via scheduled reboot execution, and ChaCha20-based encryption. Separate technical analysis has described newer Pay2Key encryptors as derived from the Mimic and Conti ransomware lineage. Pay2Key is notable for sitting at the intersection of state-backed cyber operations and ransomware economics. Its evolution into a RaaS model, recruitment of affiliates from Russian-speaking criminal ecosystems, and preferential revenue-sharing for attacks against Iran’s adversaries reinforce assessments that the operation serves geopolitical as well as financial purposes.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
40 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
15 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Iran-linked ransomware operation targeting US healthcare with disruptive and strategic objectives.
Iranian-government-linked ransomware activity targeting a US healthcare organization, with access established before attack and ransomware deployed rapidly; described as more destructive than financially motivated in this case.
An Iranian ransomware-as-a-service operation tied to the Iranian government and Fox Kitten, targeting a U.S. healthcare organization and using improved evasion, execution, and anti-forensics techniques. The group historically used double extortion, though no data was exfiltrated in this incident.
An Iranian state-backed ransomware operation being revived to attack high-impact US targets, recruit affiliates from Russian cybercriminal forums, and support Iran's geopolitical objectives through ransomware, pseudo-ransomware, and profit-sharing incentives.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.