DoNot Team is a South Asia-focused advanced persistent threat group active since at least 2016 and widely tracked as APT-C-35. It is also known by aliases including DoNot, Donot Team, Mint Tempest, Origami Elephant, SECTOR02, SectorE02, and Viceroy Tiger. Multiple vendors assess the group as India-aligned, and its operations are consistently characterized as cyber-espionage. DoNot Team primarily targets government, military, diplomatic, and foreign affairs entities across South Asia, with repeated activity against organizations in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, as well as Kashmiri non-profit organizations and Pakistani officials. Reporting also shows expansion beyond its traditional regional focus, including targeting of a European foreign affairs ministry. The group has conducted sustained intelligence-gathering campaigns using both Windows and Android malware. Its intrusion activity commonly begins with spearphishing and malicious documents, including Microsoft Office files, RTF remote-template injection, exploit delivery using CVE-2017-11882, and archive-based lures themed around regional geopolitical issues such as Kashmir. DoNot Team has also been observed abusing Foxit PDF Reader behavior to induce user-assisted execution. Delivery chains often use staged loaders, shellcode, XOR-encoded or encrypted intermediate payloads, and DLL-based implants executed through rundll32 or similar mechanisms. The group demonstrates mature post-compromise tradecraft including host profiling, encrypted command-and-control, scheduled-task or startup-based persistence, anti-VM checks, dynamic API resolution, string encryption, selective payload delivery, and geofencing to restrict malicious content to intended victims. Windows toolsets associated with the actor include the yty malware framework and variants such as Gedit, DarkMusical, Henos, and LoptikMod. These toolsets support data collection and modular tasking, including file harvesting, screen capture, keylogging, reverse shell capability, downloader functionality, and exfiltration. DoNot Team also maintains an Android espionage capability. Its Android operations have used loaders such as Firestarter, which leverage Firebase Cloud Messaging for resilient tasking and selective second-stage delivery. Android payloads attributed to the group support extensive surveillance functions including collection of user, device, location, communications, application, and file data, and have been used in highly targeted campaigns related to India, Pakistan, and Kashmir. The actor’s operational pattern is consistent with long-term espionage against strategic and political targets, especially defense, diplomatic, and state institutions in South Asia.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
41 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
9 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
4 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
269 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting targeted cyber-espionage against Bangladesh military and defence personnel using spear-phishing RTF lures, remote template injection, multi-stage loaders, DLL implants, scheduled-task persistence, and live C2-delivered second-stage modules.
Conducting a targeted cyber-espionage intrusion against Bangladesh military and defence personnel using spear-phished RTF lures, remote template injection, staged shellcode delivery, and a DLL implant with scheduled-task persistence and HTTPS C2.
Conducting an active multi-stage cyber-espionage campaign against Bangladeshi military and defence targets using spear-phished RTF lures, remote template injection, staged shellcode loaders, persistent DLL implants, and encrypted HTTPS C2 communications.
Cyber espionage campaigns targeting government, foreign ministry, defense, diplomatic, and NGO entities, including a recent spear-phishing campaign against a Southern European / European foreign affairs ministry using Google Drive-delivered malware.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.