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UNC5792 is a Russia-linked cyber-espionage cluster associated with officers of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), including the FSB Border Guards. It is also tracked as UAC-0195. The group conducts targeted social-engineering and phishing operations against users of encrypted commercial messaging applications, particularly Signal and WhatsApp. Its targets include current and former government officials, military leaders, allied personnel, journalists, political figures, Ukrainian officials, civil-society organizations, and individuals with access to sensitive political, military, and governmental communications. UNC5792 impersonates messaging-platform support accounts to solicit verification codes, account PINs, and Signal Backup Recovery Keys. It has also abused legitimate linked-device functionality through malicious QR codes and modified group-invitation workflows, enabling attacker-controlled devices to be associated with victim accounts. These operations can expose message histories, group conversations, contact lists, and subsequent communications, and compromised accounts may be used to conduct follow-on phishing against trusted contacts. The activity relies on manipulation of users and legitimate account features rather than exploitation of weaknesses in application encryption. UNC5792 has additionally used AI models to review Telegram channels for information of interest to Russian authorities, including material concerning security threats and extremist content. Its operations are consistent with Russian state intelligence collection objectives.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
17 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Russia-based activity using AI models to collect and filter Telegram-channel content concerning security threats and extremist content for Russian authorities.
Linked to widespread phishing campaigns targeting Signal users.
Conducting phishing/social-engineering operations to seize Signal accounts by impersonating support staff and tricking high-value targets into sharing backup recovery keys, verification codes, or account PINs.
Conducting a phishing campaign against Signal users by impersonating Signal support to steal Backup Recovery Keys, and previously seeking account verification codes and Signal PINs.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.