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PhantomCore is a cyberespionage threat group first publicly identified in 2024, primarily targeting Russian and Belarusian organizations. Its targets include industrial manufacturers, IT companies, chemical producers, financial and leasing businesses, oil-and-gas companies, utilities, municipal services, aerospace enterprises, construction firms, and e-commerce businesses. Its operations encompass information theft, credential harvesting, remote access, and ransomware deployment. Its country of origin and state sponsorship have not been established at high confidence. PhantomCore commonly obtains initial access through spearphishing sent from compromised corporate mailboxes. Delivery mechanisms include password-protected RAR and ZIP archives, exploitation of WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831, malicious Excel macros, document-disguised Windows shortcuts, and phishing websites using fake CAPTCHA prompts to deliver MeshAgent. The group has also exploited TrueConf vulnerabilities and scanned exposed web resources with WhatWeb. It develops custom malware including PhantomRAT, PhantomDL, PhantomRShell, PhantomTaskShell, PhantomProxyLite, and PhantomStealer, and has deployed the PowerShell-based KermitRAT. PhantomRAT evolved from a .NET implementation to Go, while PhantomDL has appeared in Go and C++ variants. Post-compromise activity includes command execution through PowerShell and Windows command shells, host and network discovery, file collection, keylogging, screenshots, browser credential theft, and credential dumping from LSASS and Active Directory databases. Persistence mechanisms include disguised scheduled tasks, Windows services, local accounts, and web shells. The group moves laterally using RDP, SMB, WinRM, and Impacket tooling. Its defense-evasion techniques include obfuscation, packing, anti-analysis checks, DLL execution-flow hijacking, security-control disabling, and event-log clearing. Command-and-control infrastructure combines rented VPS systems and compromised legitimate servers with HTTP, HTTPS, SSH tunnels, and SOCKS5 proxies; exfiltration also uses cloud storage and FTP. PhantomCore has deployed LockBit 3.0 to encrypt compromised systems, including distributing ransomware through Kaspersky Security Center. Tooling and infrastructure overlaps connect it to the separately tracked Bearlyfy ransomware group, but these overlaps do not establish that Bearlyfy is an alias or subgroup.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
13 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
8 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
142 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
19 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Group aligned with Ukrainian interests that attacks Russian and Belarusian companies and conducts APT-style campaigns emphasizing reconnaissance, persistence, and data exfiltration.
Suspected pro-Ukrainian cluster targeting Russian companies across multiple sectors using phishing with ZIP attachments to deliver PowerShell-based malware similar to PhantomRemote.
Conducting phishing campaigns targeting Russian and Belarusian companies.
Фишинговые/вредоносные email-рассылки по российским и белорусским организациям с доставкой LNK, который запускает многостадийный PowerShell-загрузчик/бекдор. Закрепляется через планировщик задач и реализует polling C2 (получение команд и отправка результатов).
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.