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Trigona is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since 2022. It operates Windows and Linux encryptors and uses a double-extortion model: affiliates steal selected victim data before encrypting systems and threaten publication through leak-site and negotiation infrastructure. The operation has used Monero for ransom payments and maintains affiliate-oriented operational infrastructure. Trigona has targeted organizations in technology, health care, manufacturing, financial services, construction, agriculture, marketing, and other sectors. Its operators have repeatedly targeted internet-exposed Microsoft SQL Server environments, gaining access through weak or brute-forced credentials, compromised accounts, and exploitation of vulnerable public-facing software, including CVE-2021-40539. Intrusions have included reconnaissance, network scanning, credential dumping, creation of privileged or remote-access-capable accounts, use of remote-management software, and lateral movement over RDP and other administrative mechanisms. The group has used CLR-based SQL Server command execution and the SQL Server Bulk Copy Program to stage malware from database content. It has deployed ransomware directly as well as Mimic ransomware in closely related activity. Trigona operators have used security-disabling tools, elevated-execution utilities, vulnerable kernel drivers, credential-recovery utilities, and backup- and recovery-inhibition techniques. They have also used AnyDesk and other remote-access tooling to maintain hands-on access. For data theft, Trigona affiliates previously used publicly available transfer tools including Rclone. In 2026, affiliates were observed using a custom command-line uploader designed to prioritize high-value documents, use parallel transfers, rotate network connections, and filter unwanted file types. The operation was disrupted when Ukrainian Cyber Alliance actors compromised and wiped its infrastructure in October 2023, but subsequent activity demonstrated that Trigona continued or resumed operations.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
54 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
3 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware-as-a-service operation conducting double extortion. It exfiltrates data to cloud storage, operates a leak site, and uses preview listings, countdown timers, and bidding options to pressure victims.
Mentioned only as background in connection with prior SqlShell malware use on MS-SQL compromises.
Ransomware-as-a-Service operation using a custom-built command-line data exfiltration tool to steal data faster and evade detection during ransomware attacks.
Conducting ransomware attacks using double-extortion tactics and, as of March 2026, using a custom data-exfiltration tool (uploader_client.exe) instead of relying solely on public tools.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.