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UNC3810 is a GRU-linked threat actor associated with disruptive cyber operations against Windows enterprise environments in Ukraine. The actor has been observed modifying Group Policy Objects to distribute scheduled tasks across a domain in order to deploy CADDYWIPER, a destructive wiper used to enumerate physical drives and overwrite file contents and partitions. UNC3810 has also used tooling such as TANKTRAP to create Group Policy Preference files that facilitate retrieval and execution of the wiper from domain infrastructure. Observed tradecraft shows a focus on disruptive effects rather than stealth or monetization. In one documented operation, UNC3810 staged an initial 64-bit CADDYWIPER variant that was blocked by endpoint protection, then recompiled and deployed a 32-bit variant and attempted to exclude it from antivirus scanning. The operation had limited impact because of operator errors, incompatible Group Policy settings, operating-system mismatches, insufficient reconnaissance, and effective defensive actions. This aligns with broader patterns in GRU disruptive activity in which destructive tooling is deployed despite uneven operational execution. UNC3810 has also been linked to coordinated information operations. A Telegram persona using the name Cyber Army of Russia Reborn claimed responsibility for a wiper incident and advertised victim data, while available evidence indicates the persona exaggerated the operational success. The activity reflects coordination between cyber disruption and pro-Russian influence messaging intended to amplify psychological impact. Known aliases directly supported here include UNC3810, and the associated influence persona is Cyber Army of Russia Reborn.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Geographies tied to known operations.
4 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
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