Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
1 malware familyExploits CVEs in the wild

World Leaks

Also known ashunters_internationalworld_leaksworldleaks

World Leaks is a cybercriminal extortion group that emerged in early 2025 as a rebrand of the Hunters International ransomware operation, which had been active since 2023. Reporting in the provided content describes World Leaks as the successor to Hunters International and notes a strategic shift away from file encryption toward pure data theft and leak-based extortion, with the group stealing company data and threatening public release unless payment is made. Known aliases in the content are World Leaks, WorldLeaks, world_leaks, and Hunters International. The group has been linked in the content to incidents affecting organizations in manufacturing, healthcare, technology, consumer services, and energy, with many claimed victims in the United States as well as victims in Europe, Canada, India, and China. Specific victim claims or links mentioned in the content include Tata Electronics, Nike, Dell, Bradford Health Services/Bradford Health Partners, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, and other organizations listed on its leak site. For Tata Electronics, World Leaks claimed to have stolen and published more than 200,000 files totaling over 630 GB, and reporting cited alleged exposure of emails, event logs, employee passport copies, SAP-related records, and documents tied to Apple and Tesla. The content also states that World Leaks made ransom demands in connection with Tata Electronics and that researchers observed the data on the group’s Tor-accessible dark web site. In the Nike case, World Leaks claimed theft of 1.4 TB across 188,000 files. The content also notes that some prior claims, such as Dell, involved more limited data than initially implied. The provided reporting states that World Leaks focuses on data exfiltration and extortion rather than encrypting victim systems. One source in the content says the group commonly gains initial access through phishing, compromised credentials, or exploitation of exposed services, then performs data discovery and exfiltration, prioritizing confidential corporate or personal information. The content also notes Hunters International use of Rclone as a primary exfiltration tool with WinSCP as a fallback in some intrusions. World Leaks is described in the content as an active extortion actor in the broader ransomware ecosystem despite its move away from encryption, and one report identifies LockBit, World Leaks, and TheGentlemen as leading groups observed targeting organizations in China.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Technology Hardware & Equipment

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇮🇳 India
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics52 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1598
Phishing for Information
TA0001
Initial Access
4 techniques
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1133×2
External Remote Services
T1190×4
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×2
Phishing
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1059×2
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1569
System Services
T1569.002
Service Execution
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1133×2
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1110
Brute Force
T1552
Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001
Credentials In Files
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1018
Remote System Discovery
T1046×2
Network Service Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1135
Network Share Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
4 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.004
SSH
T1080
Taint Shared Content
T1210
Exploitation of Remote Services
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1039×2
Data from Network Shared Drive
T1074×5
Data Staged
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1571
Non-Standard Port
T1572
Protocol Tunneling
TA0010
Exfiltration
5 techniques
T1020×2
Automated Exfiltration
T1041×7
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048×3
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×4
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×6
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.003×2
Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040
Impact
2 techniques
T1486×16
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1657×12
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

15 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping42

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal1

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs2

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables15

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.