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Mallory
3 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Rhysida

Also known asrhysida

Rhysida is a financially motivated ransomware group active since at least May 2023 that operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service platform. Reporting in the provided content describes Rhysida as notable for extorting healthcare organizations and other critical infrastructure, with healthcare, education, and government also cited among affected sectors. Most victims referenced in one IBM X-Force analysis were in the United States. The group has been linked to incidents affecting healthcare organizations and public-sector entities, including claims around Prospect Medical Holdings, Cookeville Regional Medical Center, Columbus city systems, and an airport attack referenced in the content. The content links Rhysida to several upstream criminal service providers and tooling ecosystems. Multiple reports state that the initial access broker Woodgnat, also known as KongTuke, has sold or enabled access for ransomware groups including Rhysida, alongside Qilin, Interlock, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta. Woodgnat has used compromised WordPress sites, ClickFix/FileFix/CrashFix lures, and Microsoft Teams helpdesk impersonation to obtain access. Rhysida operators have also been associated with use of SYSTEMBC, which Kroll says is favored by Rhysida operators and was deployed after access in at least one healthcare intrusion. Intel 471 also lists Rhysida among groups observed exploiting AnyDesk. The provided content highlights strong links between Rhysida and Interlock. IBM X-Force reported that both groups used the Supper backdoor, also known as SocksShell or WINDYTWIST, and found code and behavioral similarities across Supper, InterlockRAT, NodeSnake, JunkFiction, and ModeloRAT. Both groups were described as relying on trojanized software installers, fake Microsoft Teams download pages, traffic distribution systems, and ClickFix-style lures for initial access and payload delivery. IBM also noted post-compromise use of tools such as AZcopy, Advanced Port Scanner, and credential stealers. Another source in the content states the exact relationship between Interlock and Rhysida is unknown, while Cisco Talos previously assessed with low confidence that Interlock may have emerged from Rhysida operators or developers. Additional reporting in the content discusses a possible rebrand from Vice Society to Rhysida, but this is presented as analysis of a possible rebrand rather than a confirmed fact. The content also references Rhysida in broader ransomware ecosystem reporting, including use of traffic distribution services such as TAG-124 and mention in Microsoft reporting on Fox Tempest-enabled malware-signing activity.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

36 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics44 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
5 techniques
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
T1133×3
External Remote Services
T1189×3
Drive-by Compromise
T1190×2
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×4
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
T1133×3
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
6 techniques
T1027×2
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036×4
Masquerading
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×2
System Checks
T1620×2
Reflective Code Loading
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002×4
Code Signing
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1110
Brute Force
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1046
Network Service Discovery
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×2
System Checks
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021×2
Remote Services
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1210
Exploitation of Remote Services
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1074×2
Data Staged
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071×2
Application Layer Protocol
T1090
Proxy
T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
T1105×4
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
4 techniques
T1041×7
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×2
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×5
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1485
Data Destruction
T1486×20
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1657×6
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

71 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping36

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal3

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables71

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.