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Everest is a Russian-speaking cybercriminal extortion and ransomware group active since late 2020. It is widely tracked as Everest, with aliases including Everest Group, Everest Ransomware, Everest Ransomware Gang, and Everest Team. The group initially operated as a ransomware actor using encryption, but later shifted primarily toward data theft and extortion, including encryption-less extortion and, in some reporting, double-extortion activity. Everest has also operated as an initial access broker, reselling compromised network access and credentials to other criminals, and has reportedly sought insider access to victim environments. Everest targets organizations across multiple sectors and geographies, with repeated victim reporting involving the United States and Europe, including Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, and the Czech Republic, as well as Japan and Kuwait. Reported victims and claimed targets span technology, transportation, healthcare, insurance, manufacturing, energy, telecommunications, and defense-related organizations. The group has been associated with attacks or extortion claims involving supplier and third-party platforms, indicating a willingness to exploit trusted business relationships and compromised partner credentials to reach downstream victims. Operationally, Everest is best known for exfiltrating data and threatening publication rather than relying solely on disruptive encryption. Reported tradecraft includes initial access through compromised credentials, data exfiltration, extortion demands tied to stolen information, and post-compromise monetization through sale of access. The group has maintained a leak-site presence for victim shaming and pressure, although its infrastructure has experienced disruption, including periods in which sites went offline and a later defacement of its original leak site in 2025 before operations resumed on a new domain. Everest has remained active in victim-claim reporting through 2026 despite earlier indications in 2021 that it might have shut down. Everest is assessed as financially motivated. Its activity reflects the broader convergence of ransomware, data-theft extortion, and access brokerage in the Russian-speaking cybercrime ecosystem.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
32 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
4 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware group listed among the active groups for the week with claimed victims.
Conducting a ransomware attack resulting in a data breach against Keysight.
Ransomware/extortion group tied to a July 2026 attack on Stadler Rail. In this incident, the group allegedly used compromised supplier credentials to access a shared data-exchange platform, stole technical data, and demanded 10 million Swiss francs. The content says the group originally used encrypting ransomware but later shifted to data theft and extortion without encrypting victim systems.
Conducting extortion following a breach of a supplier-linked data exchange platform; described as having evolved from data-theft-only operations into a hybrid ransomware and initial access broker operation, including selling stolen credentials and recruiting insiders for network access.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.