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13 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Paper Werewolf

Also known asGOFFEEpaper_werewolf

GOFFEE, also tracked as Paper Werewolf, is a threat actor first observed in early 2022. Reporting in the provided content states that it has targeted organizations exclusively in the Russian Federation, including entities in the media, telecommunications, construction, government, and energy sectors. The group primarily uses targeted spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments for initial access. Known aliases in the content are GOFFEE and Paper Werewolf. From May 2022 through summer 2023, GOFFEE used a modified Owowa malicious IIS module. Beginning in 2024, it used patched malicious copies of Windows binaries such as explorer.exe and xpsrchvw.exe, as well as malicious Office documents with VBA macros. Those macro chains created HTA and PowerShell files, persisted via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LOAD registry value, and launched additional payloads. The group used the PowerShell implant PowerModul and the non-public Mythic agent PowerTaskel in attacks during 2024. PowerModul retrieved and executed additional PowerShell payloads from C2 and delivered components including PowerTaskel, FlashFileGrabber, and USB Worm. FlashFileGrabber was used to steal files from removable media, and USB Worm propagated via removable drives. The content also states GOFFEE increasingly shifted from the PowerShell-based PowerTaskel to a custom binary Mythic agent for lateral movement and remote execution. Observed lateral movement and execution techniques included renamed PsExec, mshta.exe, WinRM, HTA/JScript chains, shellcode loaders, and remote execution via wmiprvse.exe or wsmprovhost.exe launching mshta.exe. The content also notes use of the User-Agent string "Ruby WinRM Client" in WinRM activity. Separate reporting in the content links Paper Werewolf/GOFFEE to Telegram- and website-based malware distribution themed around Starlink and UAV/drone training. In those campaigns, the actor used a dedicated Telegram channel and the domains battleflight[.]org and battleflight[.]pro to distribute the EchoGather RAT disguised as Starlink-related software or the BattleFlight drone pilot training simulator. The same Telegram channel was also used to distribute phishing links through intermediary domains such as re-link[.]space and mystarlink[.]org to fake Telegram pages for credential theft. The content further links Paper Werewolf infrastructure to a Node.js-based JavaScript downloader chain that persisted via the same Windows LOAD registry value and repeatedly fetched shellcode from zeccecard[.]com, as well as to ZIP/RAR files containing Python and C++ loaders for a custom Mythic implant. The actor is also described in the content as exploiting WinRAR vulnerabilities CVE-2025-6218 and CVE-2025-8088. Multiple excerpts state that Paper Werewolf/GOFFEE leveraged these vulnerabilities in 2025, including against government organizations. Additional reporting in the content says Paper Werewolf targeted Russian organizations with a Linux rootkit named Sauropsida, and that it deployed the EchoGather RAT and PowerModul implant in targeted attacks. The content also notes overlap or possible links between GOFFEE and other clusters or groups. Researchers found Warp RAT samples in attacked infrastructures and associated them with Goffee. Separate reporting notes thematic and partial infrastructure overlap between GOFFEE/Paper Werewolf and HeartlessSoul, particularly around FPV simulator and Starlink-themed infrastructure. Other Kaspersky reporting cited in the content found traces of Goffee in victim networks alongside 4BID, Hacker kiт, and C.A.S., but only indicates possible links or joint operations rather than confirmed subgroup structure.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Telecommunication Services
  • Capital Goods
  • Government & Administration
  • Energy

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇷🇺 Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

11 of 15 tactics65 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
4 techniques
T1091×2
Replication Through Removable Media
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1190×2
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×2
Phishing
T1566.001×2
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×2
Spearphishing Link
T1566.003
Spearphishing via Service
TA0002
Execution
5 techniques
T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×3
PowerShell
T1059.003×4
Windows Command Shell
T1059.005×3
Visual Basic
T1059.007×2
JavaScript
T1129×2
Shared Modules
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002×4
Malicious File
T1569
System Services
T1569.002
Service Execution
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1505
Server Software Component
T1505.003
Web Shell
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×3
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009×2
Shortcut Modification
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1055×3
Process Injection
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×3
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009×2
Shortcut Modification
TA0005
Stealth
8 techniques
T1027×6
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.007
Dynamic API Resolution
T1027.013
Encrypted/Encoded File
T1036×4
Masquerading
T1055×3
Process Injection
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005×2
Mshta
T1497×2
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×2
System Checks
T1564
Hide Artifacts
T1564.001×2
Hidden Files and Directories
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
TA0006
Credential Access
3 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.004
Windows Credential Manager
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1082×4
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1497×2
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×2
System Checks
T1518
Software Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.002×2
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.006×2
Windows Remote Management
T1091×2
Replication Through Removable Media
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1025×3
Data from Removable Media
T1039
Data from Network Shared Drive
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×5
Web Protocols
T1105×6
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041×4
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.

IOCS

Observables

42 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping47

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal13

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs5

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables42

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.

Paper Werewolf | Mallory