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Ghostwriter, also tracked as UNC1151 and UAC-0057, is a Belarus-aligned threat actor and influence operation cluster associated with long-running cyber-espionage, credential theft, and information manipulation activity. Multiple public assessments link the actor to Belarusian state interests, with technical and operational evidence pointing to Belarus and possible ties to the Belarusian military. The group has also been described by some defenders under the cluster name FrostyNeighbor. Ghostwriter became widely known for combining intrusions with disinformation and hack-and-leak operations, including compromises of legitimate news or social-media accounts to spread false narratives, especially anti-NATO and politically destabilizing content in Eastern Europe. The actor has persistently targeted governments, politicians, military personnel, journalists, researchers, public officials, activists, dissidents, media figures, and other high-profile individuals. Reported victim geography is concentrated in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, and Belarus, with activity also affecting broader Central and Eastern Europe. Since Belarus’ disputed 2020 election, Ghostwriter activity has been assessed as increasingly aligned with Belarusian government priorities, including targeting Belarusian opposition figures and narratives hostile to neighboring states. Operationally, Ghostwriter is strongly associated with spear-phishing and credential-harvesting campaigns against webmail and consumer email platforms. The group has impersonated security alerts and account-administration messages, used compromised accounts to deliver lures, and repeatedly targeted the same victims to improve success rates. Documented tradecraft includes fake login portals, redirects through compromised websites, Browser-in-the-Browser techniques, real-time relay of credentials and one-time codes to bypass common MFA methods, and phishing against Gmail as well as regional mail providers. Post-compromise objectives include mailbox access, theft of sensitive documents and contacts, takeover of linked social-media accounts, and follow-on influence activity. Ghostwriter has also delivered malware in espionage campaigns. Public reporting links the actor to MicroBackdoor and to more recent tooling such as OYSTERBLUES, OYSTERFRESH, and OYSTERSHUCK. Observed delivery chains have used malicious archives, CHM and HTA-based execution, Office macros, DLL execution via system utilities, scheduled tasks, startup persistence, and obfuscated loaders. Reported capabilities include host reconnaissance, screenshot capture, file transfer, command execution, persistence, and information stealing from compromised organizations. The actor’s dominant motivation is espionage in support of state political and security objectives, with influence operations serving as a recurring complementary line of effort.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
45 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
17 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
12 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
CERT Poland on Friday warned that threat actors are exploiting a Roundcube XSS flaw in a spear-phishing campaign aimed at credential theft. CERT Poland attributed the activity to the Belarusian hacking group UNC1151. Tracked as CVE-2024-42009, the flaw leads to JavaScript code execution when opening an email.
Earlier in 2025, an apparent sender from 193.29.58.37 spoofed the Libyan Navy’s Office of Protocol to send a then-zero-day exploit in Zimbra’s Collaboration Suite, CVE-2025-27915, targeting Brazil’s military.
Threat Actors (TAs) leveraging a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, identified as CVE-2023-38831, to deliver their payload on compromised systems... The aforementioned vulnerability allows the WinRAR application to extract and execute the malicious script when a user tries to open a benign file within the archive.
307 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Threat actor mentioned only as part of broader background on the Ukraine cyber threat landscape.
Conducting targeted spear-phishing and credential theft operations against politically sensitive targets in Belarus and Ukraine, including fake Google login pages and phishing pages impersonating Ukrainian portals.
Conducted a spear-phishing campaign against government organizations using compromised accounts to deliver the OYSTERBLUES information stealer.
Conducting broad credential phishing and spear-phishing campaigns, including Gmail account phishing and impersonation of Ukrainian portals, targeting individuals in Belarus, Poland, and Ukraine.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.