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TigerJack is a threat actor associated with malicious developer-tooling supply-chain activity, particularly the publication of trojanized Visual Studio Code extensions across extension marketplaces including the official VS Code Marketplace and OpenVSX. The actor has been observed uploading at least 11 malicious extensions in a sustained campaign aimed at developers, with an emphasis on cryptocurrency theft and covert backdoor delivery. TigerJack’s operations abuse trust in IDE extension ecosystems to gain execution on developer workstations. Observed capabilities include source-code exfiltration, dynamic retrieval and execution of additional JavaScript payloads, covert cryptomining deployment, backdoor injection into developer projects, credential and API key theft, and real-time victim monitoring. Reporting also indicates the extensions can be used to establish persistence and provide a foothold for follow-on compromise of corporate environments through infected developer machines. The actor has demonstrated the ability to distribute tainted plugins across multiple marketplaces simultaneously and to reintroduce malicious extensions after takedowns, indicating an adaptive and persistent campaign model. TigerJack appears primarily financially motivated, with cryptocurrency theft as the clearest recurring objective. The actor’s tradecraft also creates broader downstream risk to software supply chains because compromised developer endpoints and poisoned projects can enable further intrusion, post-exploitation, and propagation into enterprise networks. No high-confidence attribution to a nation-state or specific country of origin is currently available.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Supply-chain campaign distributing malicious/tainted IDE plugins (VS Code extensions) across multiple extension marketplaces to compromise developer environments and potentially trojanize source code or build pipelines.
Supply-chain style abuse of developer marketplaces by repeatedly uploading malicious VS Code extensions (including re-uploads after takedown) with the apparent goal of cryptocurrency theft.
Uploaded multiple malicious VSCode/OpenVSX extensions to target developers, enabling source code exfiltration, remote JavaScript payload retrieval/execution, credential/API key theft, CoinIMP cryptominer deployment, and potential follow-on actions such as ransomware deployment, backdoor injection into projects, and using compromised developer endpoints as pivots into corporate networks.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.