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Financially Motivated7 malware families

Silent Ransom Group

Also known asCHATTY SPIDERLuna Mothsilent_ransom_groupStorm-0252unc3753

Silent Ransom Group is a financially motivated cyber extortion actor, also tracked as UNC3753, Luna Moth, and Chatty Spider, active since at least 2022, with reporting also stating activity since at least March 2022. The group focuses on data theft and extortion rather than file encryption, and has been described as shifting away from ransomware deployment to extortion-only operations. Reporting in the provided content links the actor to the broader Conti ecosystem and notes tactical overlaps with UNC2686; the content also states UNC3753 deployed LOCKBIT.BLACK in 2022 before prioritizing data-theft extortion. The actor heavily relies on social engineering rather than malware-first intrusion tradecraft. Its campaigns use callback phishing, voice phishing, and impersonation of internal IT help desk or support staff. Common lures include invoice-themed emails, data migration pretexts, and earlier subscription-themed billing emails. Victims are persuaded to join screen-sharing sessions via Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Quick Assist, Terminal Services, or similar tools, and then to install legitimate remote monitoring and management software including AnyDesk, Bomgar, Zoho Assist, and SuperOps RMM. The content also states the group has used privnote.com to share installation links and instructions. After gaining access, Silent Ransom Group rapidly searches for and stages sensitive data, including legal agreements, tax forms, audit files, Social Security numbers, personally identifiable information, financial records, and other high-value corporate documents. The content specifically notes targeting of document repositories and cloud platforms such as iManage, OneDrive, SharePoint, and mapped network drives. Exfiltration methods directly mentioned include WinSCP, Rclone, FTP, browser-based uploads to attacker-controlled cloud storage, and email forwarding from victim accounts. Multiple reports in the content state the group often moves from initial contact to data theft within a single business day, and in some cases in under an hour, with extortion emails often sent within about 30 minutes after leaving the environment. Extortion threats include notifying employees, clients, partners, journalists, regulators, or customers and publishing stolen data on the group’s LEAKEDDATA or business-data-leaks.com leak site. The content consistently identifies U.S. law firms as a primary target, with additional targeting of legal, financial, professional services, insurance, healthcare, hospitality, accounting, and related organizations. Multiple reports describe active campaigns from January through May 2026 affecting dozens of U.S.-based organizations, especially law firms and financial or professional services firms. A notable escalation described in the content is the use of in-person social engineering. If remote social engineering fails, individuals linked to the group have reportedly appeared at victim offices posing as IT technicians or support staff, claiming they need to image devices or create backups, then attempting to steal data directly to USB or other external drives. The content attributes these physical intrusion incidents as likely associated with UNC3753 based on structural, timeline, and targeting overlaps, while also noting limited forensic evidence prevented formal attribution in some cases. The content also states that Silent Ransom Group uses phishing domains following patterns such as <organization>-itdesk[.]com, <organization>-it[.]com, and <organization>-helpdesk[.]com. Separate reporting in the content says the group operates leak infrastructure at business-data-leaks.com and has used fast-flux infrastructure backed by rotating residential IP addresses across multiple countries and ISPs to make takedown more difficult.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Financial Services
  • Insurance

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

39 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics48 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
2 techniques
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1598×2
Phishing for Information
T1598.004×8
Spearphishing Voice
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001
Domains
TA0001
Initial Access
6 techniques
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1091×2
Replication Through Removable Media
T1133×4
External Remote Services
T1199
Trusted Relationship
T1200×2
Hardware Additions
T1566×9
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.003×2
Spearphishing via Service
T1566.004
Spearphishing Voice
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1133×4
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1036×2
Masquerading
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1135×2
Network Share Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
T1580
Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
3 techniques
T1021×7
Remote Services
T1091×2
Replication Through Removable Media
T1534×2
Internal Spearphishing
TA0009
Collection
5 techniques
T1005×2
Data from Local System
T1056
Input Capture
T1074×6
Data Staged
T1213×5
Data from Information Repositories
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×3
Remote Access Tools
T1568
Dynamic Resolution
TA0010
Exfiltration
4 techniques
T1048×2
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1052×2
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
T1052.001×2
Exfiltration over USB
T1537×2
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×5
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002×3
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
2 techniques
T1486×3
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1657
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

354 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping39

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal7

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables354

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.