TaskMasters is a cyberespionage group identified in 2018, with observed activity dating back to at least 2010. It has compromised more than 30 organizations across multiple countries, with a significant concentration of victims in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Its targets primarily include manufacturing and industrial organizations, alongside energy, government, technology, software development, systems integration, transport and logistics, real estate, and construction. Its objectives are theft of confidential documents and sustained access to executive workstations, key servers, and business-critical systems. Its country of origin and state sponsorship have not been definitively established. The group takes its name from its use of Windows Task Scheduler for lateral movement, particularly through the AtNow utility. Operations involve internal reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, credential extraction, remote command execution, and progression from workstations to domain controllers and file and application servers. TaskMasters combines publicly available tools such as Mimikatz, PWDump, GsecDump, NbtScan, PSExec, and WinRAR with custom utilities for document discovery, email extraction, file copying, archiving, and exfiltration. Supply-chain attacks are also part of its activity. Its principal malware family, RemShell, includes a downloader and a command-execution backdoor supporting file transfers. RemShell uses an intermediary server to obtain its main command-and-control address and protects communications with RC4 encryption and Base64 encoding. TaskMasters maintains backup access through web shells on externally accessible systems, including Exchange servers, and uses a custom web shell that disguises its authentication interface as an IIS error page. Additional evasion techniques include timestamp manipulation and encrypted command logs. The group also uses Webdav-O malware to communicate through a legitimate service to bypass network defenses.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
1 distinct technique observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
21 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
16 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
179 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as a historical comparison for using a legitimate cloud service as command-and-control infrastructure to bypass network defenses. The content does not connect TaskMasters to the analyzed attacks on Russian companies.
Mentioned only as background concerning previously reported Chinese nation-state threats. The content does not connect TaskMasters to the attempted attacks against Group-IB or describe its specific operations.
Referenced for comparison because the group reused self-signed certificates with identical metadata across servers, aiding infrastructure tracking.
Criminal espionage-focused intrusion set targeting primarily manufacturing/industrial organizations (also energy, government, science/tech, systems integration, software, geology, transport/logistics, real estate, construction). Operates with long-term persistence, credential theft, lateral movement via scheduled tasks (AtNow/Task Scheduler), and data theft/exfiltration to C2; uses web shells as backup access and performs supply-chain attacks.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.