Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
Financially Motivated23 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Vanilla Tempest

Also known asDEV-0832Vanilla TempestVice SocietyVICE SPIDER

Vanilla Tempest is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat actor also tracked as DEV-0832, Vice Society, and Vice Spider; BlueVoyant also links it to the name Rapid Brigantine. The content ties the actor to ransomware and extortion activity since at least June 2021 or mid-2022, with frequent targeting of education, healthcare, IT, manufacturing, and other critical organizations. Multiple sources describe Vice Society/Vanilla Tempest as an intrusion, exfiltration, and extortion group that has disproportionately targeted the education sector, including K-12 institutions, and also targeted healthcare organizations. The actor is notable for using multiple ransomware families rather than a single exclusive strain. Across the provided content, Vanilla Tempest/Vice Society is associated with deployment of Hello Kitty/Five Hands, Zeppelin, BlackCat, Quantum Locker, Rhysida, and more recently INC ransomware. The content also describes a possible rebrand or linkage between Vice Society and Rhysida, and states that Check Point linked Vice Society with the Rhysida ransomware gang. In late 2024, Vice Society was observed deploying INC ransomware against the healthcare industry, and Microsoft reported Vanilla Tempest targeting U.S. healthcare organizations with INC ransomware attacks. Observed tradecraft includes initial access via exploitation of internet-facing applications, compromised valid accounts, compromised RDP credentials, spear phishing, SEO poisoning, and malware delivery through fake Microsoft Teams installers and later ClickFix lures on compromised WordPress sites. The actor has been linked to Gootloader- and Storm-0494-enabled access in at least one INC intrusion. Reported post-compromise behavior includes use of Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, PowerShell Empire, Rubeus, Mimikatz, PowerShell, AnyDesk, MEGA, WMI, RDP, DLL side-loading, scheduled tasks, undocumented Registry autostarts, process injection, masquerading, internal reconnaissance, data exfiltration, shadow-copy deletion, event-log clearing, and use of living-off-the-land techniques. The group has also exploited PrintNightmare vulnerabilities CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527 for privilege escalation. The content further links Vanilla Tempest to the Lorem Ipsum malware campaign. BlueVoyant assessed with high confidence that the Lorem Ipsum ecosystem is attributable to Vanilla Tempest/Rapid Brigantine/Vice Society/Vice Spider. That campaign shifted from trojanized Microsoft Teams installers signed via fraudulently obtained Microsoft Trusted Signing certificates to ClickFix lures on compromised WordPress sites after Microsoft disrupted Fox Tempest. BlueVoyant said the infection chain used fake browser update prompts, PowerShell execution, Node.js-based JavaScript payloads, DLL side-loading, encrypted payloads, dead-drop C2 via LetsDiskuss[.]com, and ultimately handed off to the actor’s established post-exploitation tooling, primarily for Rhysida deployment. Microsoft also identified Vanilla Tempest as a customer and co-conspirator in its legal action against Fox Tempest, the malware-signing-as-a-service operation that abused Microsoft Artifact Signing. According to the content, Vanilla Tempest used that service to deploy malware including Oyster, Lumma Stealer, and Vidar, as well as ransomware including Rhysida. Microsoft additionally states that Vanilla Tempest is associated with INC ransomware and was among the threat groups using malware signed through the Fox Tempest service. Within the Vice Society reporting specifically, the actor is described as well resourced, opportunistic, and capable of rapid operations, with some reporting noting dwell times of up to six days and that it does not operate like a typical ransomware-as-a-service affiliate model. The content states Vice Society has used double extortion, threatened publication of stolen data on its leak site, and in some cases made ransom demands exceeding $1 million. Sub-group information is not directly provided beyond the aliases and linked names above.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Academia & Research
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

14 of 15 tactics69 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
3 techniques
T1583×4
Acquire Infrastructure
T1584
Compromise Infrastructure
T1584.006
Web Services
T1608
Stage Capabilities
T1608.006×2
SEO Poisoning
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1189×3
Drive-by Compromise
T1190×3
Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1047×2
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
8 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1098
Account Manipulation
T1112
Modify Registry
T1136
Create Account
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1546
Event Triggered Execution
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
8 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1055
Process Injection
T1068×2
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1098
Account Manipulation
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1546
Event Triggered Execution
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
5 techniques
T1036×7
Masquerading
T1055
Process Injection
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.001
Clear Windows Event Logs
T1070.004
File Deletion
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0112
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
T1112
Modify Registry
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002×10
Code Signing
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1558
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1135
Network Share Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0008
Lateral Movement
3 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1080
Taint Shared Content
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1074
Data Staged
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071×2
Application Layer Protocol
T1105×4
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×2
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
TA0040
Impact
5 techniques
T1486×14
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489
Service Stop
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
T1531
Account Access Removal
T1657×2
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

56 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping51

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal23

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables56

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.