Vanilla Tempest
Vanilla Tempest is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat actor also tracked as DEV-0832, Vice Society, and Vice Spider; BlueVoyant also links it to the name Rapid Brigantine. The content ties the actor to ransomware and extortion activity since at least June 2021 or mid-2022, with frequent targeting of education, healthcare, IT, manufacturing, and other critical organizations. Multiple sources describe Vice Society/Vanilla Tempest as an intrusion, exfiltration, and extortion group that has disproportionately targeted the education sector, including K-12 institutions, and also targeted healthcare organizations. The actor is notable for using multiple ransomware families rather than a single exclusive strain. Across the provided content, Vanilla Tempest/Vice Society is associated with deployment of Hello Kitty/Five Hands, Zeppelin, BlackCat, Quantum Locker, Rhysida, and more recently INC ransomware. The content also describes a possible rebrand or linkage between Vice Society and Rhysida, and states that Check Point linked Vice Society with the Rhysida ransomware gang. In late 2024, Vice Society was observed deploying INC ransomware against the healthcare industry, and Microsoft reported Vanilla Tempest targeting U.S. healthcare organizations with INC ransomware attacks. Observed tradecraft includes initial access via exploitation of internet-facing applications, compromised valid accounts, compromised RDP credentials, spear phishing, SEO poisoning, and malware delivery through fake Microsoft Teams installers and later ClickFix lures on compromised WordPress sites. The actor has been linked to Gootloader- and Storm-0494-enabled access in at least one INC intrusion. Reported post-compromise behavior includes use of Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, PowerShell Empire, Rubeus, Mimikatz, PowerShell, AnyDesk, MEGA, WMI, RDP, DLL side-loading, scheduled tasks, undocumented Registry autostarts, process injection, masquerading, internal reconnaissance, data exfiltration, shadow-copy deletion, event-log clearing, and use of living-off-the-land techniques. The group has also exploited PrintNightmare vulnerabilities CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527 for privilege escalation. The content further links Vanilla Tempest to the Lorem Ipsum malware campaign. BlueVoyant assessed with high confidence that the Lorem Ipsum ecosystem is attributable to Vanilla Tempest/Rapid Brigantine/Vice Society/Vice Spider. That campaign shifted from trojanized Microsoft Teams installers signed via fraudulently obtained Microsoft Trusted Signing certificates to ClickFix lures on compromised WordPress sites after Microsoft disrupted Fox Tempest. BlueVoyant said the infection chain used fake browser update prompts, PowerShell execution, Node.js-based JavaScript payloads, DLL side-loading, encrypted payloads, dead-drop C2 via LetsDiskuss[.]com, and ultimately handed off to the actor’s established post-exploitation tooling, primarily for Rhysida deployment. Microsoft also identified Vanilla Tempest as a customer and co-conspirator in its legal action against Fox Tempest, the malware-signing-as-a-service operation that abused Microsoft Artifact Signing. According to the content, Vanilla Tempest used that service to deploy malware including Oyster, Lumma Stealer, and Vidar, as well as ransomware including Rhysida. Microsoft additionally states that Vanilla Tempest is associated with INC ransomware and was among the threat groups using malware signed through the Fox Tempest service. Within the Vice Society reporting specifically, the actor is described as well resourced, opportunistic, and capable of rapid operations, with some reporting noting dwell times of up to six days and that it does not operate like a typical ransomware-as-a-service affiliate model. The content states Vice Society has used double extortion, threatened publication of stolen data on its leak site, and in some cases made ransom demands exceeding $1 million. Sub-group information is not directly provided beyond the aliases and linked names above.
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Health Care Equipment & Services
- Academia & Research
Tradecraft
51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
23 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
18 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
Observables
56 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Threat actor observed deploying INC ransomware against the health care industry and known for rotating among third-party ransomware payloads.
Financially motivated threat actor behind the Lorem Ipsum ecosystem. Uses ClickFix delivery chains and established post-exploitation tooling, culminating primarily in Rhysida ransomware deployment, and is also associated with BlackCat, Zeppelin, and Quantum Locker.
Financially motivated cybercriminal group linked to the Lorem Ipsum campaign and broader ransomware/data extortion activity. The group is associated with multiple ransomware families and post-exploitation activity following initial access.
Ransomware/extortion activity targeting schools, including publishing sensitive student-related files to pressure victims.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.