TA459
TA459 is a threat actor tracked by Proofpoint and assessed as likely operating out of China. Proofpoint reported that TA459 typically targets Central Asian countries, Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and nearby regions. In 2017, Proofpoint observed TA459 targeting financial analysts at major global financial firms operating in Russia and neighboring countries, particularly analysts covering the telecommunications sector. TA459 is associated with spearphishing-based initial access and user-execution tradecraft. The actor has attempted to get victims to open malicious Microsoft Word attachments sent via spearphishing and has targeted victims using spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments. In the documented 2017 campaign, the malicious Word document exploited CVE-2017-0199, downloaded an HTA disguised as an RTF file, used VBScript and PowerShell to retrieve a PowerShell script, and then downloaded and executed the ZeroT payload. TA459 has used PowerShell for execution of a payload. Proofpoint reported TA459 using malware including ZeroT, PlugX, and NetTraveler, and also documented 2017 activity involving ZeroT with secondary payloads including PlugX and PCrat/Gh0st. In the April 20 campaign, stage-two payloads were hidden inside BMP images using least significant bit steganography, and the stage-two payload was PlugX. Proofpoint also noted TA459 continued to use RAR SFX archives for initial payload delivery. Reported infrastructure related to TA459 activity includes yandax[.]net, which was indirectly related to infrastructure used in attacks against targets in Russia and Belarus. Separate reporting cited in the content notes infrastructure overlaps between domains associated with TA459-related activity and ShadowPad-linked infrastructure, including www.ertufg[.]com and www.ncdle[.]net, and notes WHOIS relationships involving yandax[.]net. However, the content does not directly attribute TA459 itself to ShadowPad or Winnti.
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Tradecraft
34 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
attackers opportunistically used spear-phishing emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched CVE-2017-0199 to deploy the ZeroT Trojan... In this campaign, attackers used a Microsoft Word document called 0721.doc, which exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability was disclosed and patched days prior to this attack.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Observables
20 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the malicious file execution technique detected by this analytic.
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Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.