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NoName057(16), also known as NoName057, NoName05716, and nnm05716, is a pro-Russian hacktivist group active since March 2022 that conducts disruptive cyber operations in support of Russia’s geopolitical interests. The group is best known for repeated distributed denial-of-service campaigns under the DDoSia project, using a volunteer-driven model coordinated through Telegram and supported by proprietary attack tooling. Public reporting and legal actions have described the group as Russia-aligned, and U.S. criminal allegations characterize it as a state-sanctioned project involving personnel from a Russian youth-environment monitoring organization. The group has primarily targeted governments, public-sector institutions, military-related entities, financial institutions, transportation organizations, telecommunications providers, media outlets, suppliers, and other organizations in Ukraine and countries perceived as supporting Ukraine. Reported victim geography includes Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Germany, France, Israel, and the United States, among others. Operations have also been tied to broader anti-NATO and anti-Western narratives and to reputational disruption around major geopolitical events. NoName057(16)’s core capability is network denial of service. It publicly claims attacks, publishes proof of service disruption, and has used Telegram channels to recruit participants, coordinate target selection, and amplify propaganda. The DDoSia ecosystem has been described as relying on globally distributed infrastructure and volunteer-operated systems rather than a traditional botnet-only model. Reporting has also linked the group to access claims and, by 2026, to data exfiltration and monetization activity, indicating evolution beyond purely disruptive hacktivism. Law-enforcement reporting states that the group paid top participants in cryptocurrency and maintained public leaderboards to incentivize participation. The actor has been associated with Russian-linked infrastructure providers and has appeared alongside other Russia-aligned operations in shared hosting and abuse ecosystems. International law-enforcement actions in 2025 disrupted parts of its infrastructure, including more than 100 servers, and multiple arrests, searches, and warrants were reported across participating countries. Despite disruption, the group has continued to be referenced as an active pro-Russian disruptive actor.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
31 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
81 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Pro-Russian hacktivist collective conducting large-scale DDoS attacks against NATO-aligned governments and Ukrainian supporters, with evolution into data exfiltration and monetization.
Russian hacktivist group previously associated with disruptive DDoS activity; notably absent in Q2 after law-enforcement pressure.
Active hacktivist group highlighted in the report’s hacktivism section.
An opportunistic anti-Western actor providing symbolic support, amplification, and target selection within the coalition.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.