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Russia🇷🇺 RU13 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Star Blizzard

Also known asBlueCharlieCallistoCallisto GroupCold RiverCOLDRIVERGOSSAMER BEARSEABORGIUMStar BlizzardTA446unc4057

Star Blizzard is a Russia-linked cyber espionage threat actor also tracked as COLDRIVER, Callisto, Callisto Group, SEABORGIUM, TA446, UNC4057, BlueCharlie, Blue Callisto, Calisto, Cold River, Gossamer Bear, and related variants. Multiple governments and public reporting cited in the content attribute the group to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), including as a subordinate or operational unit within FSB Centre 18 / Center 18. The actor conducts tailored spear-phishing and credential theft operations against high-value targets. Reported targets include Russian and Belarusian civil society, Russian opposition figures in exile, independent media, international NGOs active in Eastern Europe, journalists, think tanks, academics, former officials, former intelligence and military officers, government and military personnel, defense contractors, Department of Energy staff, and at least one former U.S. ambassador. Reporting also states the group has targeted parliamentarians, universities, the public sector, and NGOs, and has focused heavily on NATO countries while also targeting Ukraine-related organizations. Observed tradecraft includes registering impersonation email accounts to spoof experts, colleagues, funders, government personnel, or organizations affiliated with the intended target; using compromised or lookalike accounts; and sending highly personalized phishing emails aligned to the victim’s professional context. In the documented "River of Phish" activity, the group used fake protected or encrypted PDF lures, sometimes omitting the attachment in an initial email to induce a reply before sending the lure. The PDFs directed victims to attacker-controlled infrastructure that fingerprinted the victim’s browser and system, optionally presented hCaptcha, and redirected to phishing pages impersonating Gmail or ProtonMail. The objective was credential theft, including passwords, 2FA codes, and session cookies, enabling account takeover. The content also states the group incorporated the Evilginx framework into spear-phishing activity and used JavaScript to redirect victims from adversary-controlled servers to Evilginx-hosted phishing infrastructure. Additional reporting in the content states Star Blizzard has uploaded malicious payloads to cloud storage sites and has sent emails with malicious PDF files to deliver malware. Google TAG reporting referenced in the content notes Microsoft uncovered a similar QR-code campaign tied to Callisto Group / Coldriver / Star Blizzard that targeted WhatsApp accounts linked to dozens of civil society organizations and journalists. The group has also been linked to hack-and-leak activity. The content states information stolen by COLDRIVER was used in hack-and-leak operations, including leaks related to UK-US trade documents ahead of the 2019 UK election and material used in 2022 to exacerbate Brexit-related political divisions in the United Kingdom. Law-enforcement and sanctions actions described in the content include U.S. and UK sanctions against Ruslan Aleksandrovich Peretyatko and Andrey Stanislavovich Korinets as members or associates of the group, and U.S. Department of Justice and Microsoft actions to seize more than 100 domains allegedly used in the group’s spear-phishing infrastructure.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Academia & Research
  • Independent Media
  • Military

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇷🇺 Russia
  • 🇺🇸 United States
  • 🇺🇦 Ukraine
  • 🇧🇾 Belarus

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • RU
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics77 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
4 techniques
T1589×2
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1592
Gather Victim Host Information
T1593
Search Open Websites/Domains
T1593.001
Social Media
T1598×5
Phishing for Information
T1598.003
Spearphishing Link
TA0042
Resource Development
5 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001×3
Domains
T1585
Establish Accounts
T1587
Develop Capabilities
T1587.001
Malware
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002
Tool
T1608
Stage Capabilities
T1608.001
Upload Malware
T1608.002
Upload Tool
TA0001
Initial Access
5 techniques
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1091
Replication Through Removable Media
T1133
External Remote Services
T1190×2
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×15
Phishing
T1566.001×7
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×4
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1059.005×2
Visual Basic
T1059.007×2
JavaScript
T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204×2
User Execution
T1204.002×4
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0005
Stealth
7 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.006
HTML Smuggling
T1036×5
Masquerading
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005
Mshta
T1218.014
MMC
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1564
Hide Artifacts
T1564.004
NTFS File Attributes
T1564.006
Run Virtual Instance
TA0006
Credential Access
4 techniques
T1056×4
Input Capture
T1539×2
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0007
Discovery
3 techniques
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082×3
System Information Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1091
Replication Through Removable Media
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1056×4
Input Capture
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1102
Web Service
T1102.001
Dead Drop Resolver
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2025-9491Microsoft Windows LNK File UI Misrepresentation Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence2

This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.

CVE-2025-14174Out-of-bounds memory access in ANGLE in Google Chrome on MacIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

CVE-2025-31277Memory corruption in Apple WebKit/JavaScriptCore web content processingIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

CVE-2025-43510Improper locking copy-on-write memory corruption in Apple XNU kernelIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

CVE-2025-43520Apple XNU VFS kernel race condition privilege escalationIn the wildEvidence1

The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.

2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.

IOCS

Observables

190 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping51

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal13

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs7

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables190

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.