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Star Blizzard is a Russia-based, state-sponsored cyberespionage actor associated with Centre 18 of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). It is also tracked as SEABORGIUM, COLDRIVER or Cold River, Callisto Group, TA446, TAG-53, BlueCharlie, Gossamer Bear, UNC4057, and KTA260. Its targets include government and diplomatic organizations, politicians, academia, defense organizations, NGOs, think tanks, journalists, and financial institutions. The United States and United Kingdom are prominent targets, alongside Ukrainian individuals and institutions and international organizations supporting Ukraine. The group researches targets through open sources, social media, and professional networks, then impersonates trusted contacts or respected experts. It frequently establishes apparently benign correspondence before sending credential-harvesting links or malicious attachments. Its credential-phishing operations use Evilginx to capture passwords and session cookies, enabling access despite some multifactor-authentication protections. After compromising email accounts, Star Blizzard steals messages and attachments, establishes forwarding rules for continuing access to correspondence, and uses compromised accounts and contact lists for follow-on phishing. During January–August 2026, Star Blizzard conducted at least 13 larger-scale phishing campaigns affecting more than 100 organizations, primarily in the United States and United Kingdom. It used accounts created on compromised WordPress and cPanel websites to distribute messages, including fraudulent conference invitations and administrative notices. Its RedFlick malware-delivery chain sends password-protected archives after recipients respond, using disguised shortcuts, virtual-disk containers, scripts, legitimate Windows utilities, and MSI installers to deploy the Python-based CosmicPulse backdoor. Scheduled tasks provide persistence, collect host information, and support additional payload retrieval and WebDAV-based execution. Later variants concealed encoded PowerShell commands inside PDFs. These techniques broadened the group’s reach while reducing victim interaction and limiting inspection by email-security controls.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
41 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
17 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
12 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
The exploit chains six CVEs: CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, and CVE-2025-43520.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
260 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Russia-aligned threat actor mentioned as a previous operator of the DarkSword iOS exploit kit, using fake invitation lures. The content does not attribute the P7 variant to this actor or explicitly establish state sponsorship.
Russian state-linked group conducting large-scale phishing and malware-delivery campaigns. Since January 2026, Microsoft identified at least 13 campaigns affecting more than 100 organizations, primarily in the United States and United Kingdom, with Ukrainian individuals also targeted. The group uses compromised websites to send phishing emails and the RedFlick technique to deploy CosmicPulse through infection chains requiring less user interaction. Scheduled tasks support execution, persistence, and command-and-control communication.
Russian state-backed cyber-espionage group that expanded from highly targeted spear-phishing to mass-mailing phishing campaigns. It uses compromised websites for phishing delivery and the RedFlick malware-delivery method to install the CosmicPulse backdoor, seeking broader reach, improved evasion, and more successful compromises.
Russian state-sponsored espionage activity supporting Russian interests related to the war in Ukraine. In 2026, the group shifted from highly targeted spear-phishing to larger-volume phishing operations, abused accounts on compromised CPanel and WordPress sites for email delivery, and used the RedFlick infection chain to deploy malware and establish persistence through disguised scheduled tasks.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.