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Head Mare, also known as Rainbow Hyena, is a pro-Ukrainian threat group active since at least 2023 that targets organizations in Russia and Belarus. Its targets include transportation, instrumentation, electronics, energy, information technology, software development, aerospace, and defense-related organizations. Initially characterized as a hacktivist group conducting destructive attacks, it has also conducted sophisticated, persistent intrusions without observed encryption or wiping. Earlier operations used LockBit and Babuk ransomware to encrypt victims’ systems and demand ransom payments. Head Mare obtains initial access through spearphishing, exploitation of public-facing servers, and compromised contractors. Its malware arsenal includes PhantomPyramid, PhantomRemote, PhantomCore, and PhantomGraph. Phishing campaigns have used compromised Russian corporate mail servers, malicious shortcuts, PowerShell, and executable/ZIP polyglot attachments that conceal backdoor code behind apparently benign archive content. Post-compromise activity includes infrastructure reconnaissance, privileged database access, LSASS memory dumping for credential theft, lateral movement, reverse SSH tunneling, and deletion of event logs. In a campaign identified in July 2026, Head Mare chained TrueConf Server vulnerabilities CVE-2026-72529 and CVE-2026-72530 to achieve unauthenticated script execution, escape an isolated execution environment, and execute code with SYSTEM privileges. It deployed web shells and replaced legitimate TrueConf client installers with trojanized packages delivering PhantomCore. This distribution mechanism exposed both employees of compromised organizations and external participants joining meetings hosted on compromised servers. PhantomCore established persistence through COM registration, while the two-component PhantomGraph backdoor used Windows services for persistence and Microsoft OneDrive for command-and-control. Related server compromises also involved Linux backdoors using GitHub or the TrueConf protocol for command-and-control.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
45 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
16 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
11 additional families tracked in Mallory.
5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.
This is the second TrueConf CVE in the same advisory — CVE-2026-72529 (missing authentication) and CVE-2026-72530 (code injection) both affect the same versions and port.
CVE-2026-72530 is a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in TrueConf Server versions 5.3.x–5.3.9, 5.4.x–5.4.9, 5.5.x–5.5.5, and earlier. The flaw, added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 4307/TCP to inject code and execute arbitrary commands on the server.
In one incident, they exploited the Microsoft Exchange server vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 (ProxyLogon). Although patched in 2021, this vulnerability is still exploitable due to organizations using outdated operating systems and software. The attackers used ProxyLogon to execute a command to download and launch CobInt on the server.
The group has also previously exploited the WinRAR vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-3881.
The attackers also exploited software vulnerabilities, most commonly CVE-2023-38831 in WinRAR through phishing emails.
183 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting active campaigns against Russian organizations by exploiting unpatched internet-facing TrueConf servers, implanting web shells, trojanizing client updates with backdoors, stealing credentials, conducting reconnaissance, and establishing reverse SSH tunnels.
Actively exploiting TrueConf Server vulnerabilities to gain remote code execution, replace client installers with malicious versions, deploy backdoor malware, and use web shells for infrastructure discovery and privileged database access.
Exploited two TrueConf server vulnerabilities to compromise self-hosted video conferencing servers, implant a web shell and backdoor, trojanize the Windows client installer, and distribute PhantomCore malware to meeting participants.
Pro-Ukrainian hacktivist group exploiting TrueConf vulnerabilities to compromise servers, plant web shells, move through victim infrastructure, gain privileged database access, and replace legitimate TrueConf client installers with trojanized versions carrying PhantomCore.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.