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UNC5330 is a suspected China-nexus cyberespionage actor observed compromising Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as February 2024. Its initial-access activity chained CVE-2024-21893, a server-side request forgery vulnerability, with CVE-2024-21887, a command injection vulnerability. Following compromise, UNC5330 deployed PHANTOMNET and TONERJAM. TONERJAM decrypts and executes locally stored, encrypted shellcode payloads. The actor used Windows Management Instrumentation for reconnaissance, lateral movement, registry manipulation, and persistence. Its supporting infrastructure included a GOST proxy used to facilitate malicious tool deployment to endpoints, and it attempted to retrieve Fast Reverse Proxy from a compromised VPN appliance. UNC5330 has also used Active Directory Certificate Services ESC1 certificate-template abuse for domain privilege escalation after exploiting Ivanti vulnerabilities. No additional aliases or subgroups are established.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
10 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
UNC5330 has been observed chaining CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Feb. 2024. Post-compromise activity by UNC5330 includes deployment of PHANTOMNET and TONERJAM.
Mandiant's previous blog post, Cutting Edge, Part 3: Investigating Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Exploitation and Persistence Attempts, details zero-day exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 by a suspected China-nexus espionage actor that Mandiant tracks as UNC5325.
8 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as a historical example of another actor using GOST to facilitate malicious tool deployment. The content does not connect UNC5330 to the investigated Akira incident.
Reportedly chained exploitation of Ivanti vulnerabilities with subsequent ADCS ESC1 abuse to escalate privileges to domain-level control.
Suspected China-nexus espionage actor tentatively linked to the Grager activity chain via shared Tonerjam launcher artifacts; known for exploiting Ivanti Connect Secure VPN vulnerabilities in early 2024.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.