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TA410 is a China-nexus cyberespionage umbrella cluster active since at least 2016 and tracked as distinct from APT10, though it has been loosely linked to that ecosystem. Reported aliases include Witchetty, and the cluster has been described as comprising at least three subgroups: FlowingFrog, LookingFrog, and JollyFrog. TA410 has conducted targeted espionage operations against U.S. public-sector and utility organizations, Middle Eastern governments, and Japanese organizations. TA410 has used multiple initial-access paths. These include spearphishing with weaponized documents, notably Royal Road or related RTF lures exploiting Equation Editor vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, and CVE-2018-0802, as well as malicious Office documents and XLL add-ins. It has also exploited public-facing applications, including Microsoft SharePoint and Microsoft Exchange, with activity associated with CVE-2019-0604, ProxyLogon, and ProxyShell. Its malware arsenal includes LookBack, FlowCloud, Tendyron, X4, QuasarRAT, and Korplug (PlugX). LookBack is a backdoor used for system information collection, user activity monitoring, and active remote control. FlowCloud is a modular remote access trojan with extensive functionality including filesystem, process, and service control, command shell access, screenshots, keylogging support, plugin-based extensibility, port mapping, and Nmap-assisted lateral movement. FlowCloud has also shown exfiltration support and anti-analysis features, and reporting has described rootkit-related functionality in the broader TA410 toolset. Tendyron has been characterized as a downloader. X4 is a simpler backdoor associated with the LookingFrog subgroup. JollyFrog has deployed QuasarRAT and Korplug, including via DLL sideloading. Operationally, TA410 has shown custom tooling, multi-stage infection chains, certutil-assisted payload retrieval, process injection, and suspicious server-side execution chains involving web-facing services. Campaigns attributed to TA410 have demonstrated overlap in delivery tradecraft across malware families, especially between LookBack and FlowCloud, indicating a mature and sustained espionage capability focused on long-term access, surveillance, and data theft rather than disruptive or criminal monetization.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
39 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
11 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
6 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
Royal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).
Royal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).
Royal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).
51 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
China-nexus espionage group discussed due to shared HUI Loader artifacts and possible overlap or misattribution with related operations.
TA410 is a China-nexus threat actor known for targeting government and public sector organizations, especially in Japan, using custom malware and supply chain attacks.
Cyberespionage activity leveraging an XLL stage within a broader toolkit; includes a process-injection DLL component referenced in the report.
Cyber-espionage activity cluster; in this context, incorporates an XLL-related component within a broader toolkit, including a process-injection DLL that includes an xlAutoOpen export (though execution is triggered via another export).
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.