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Anonymous Sudan, also known as AnonSudan and Storm-1359, is a cybercriminal and self-proclaimed hacktivist operation active since January 2023, primarily associated with large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks and DDoS-for-hire services. Its targets have included government agencies, hospitals, cloud providers, technology platforms, media organizations, financial services, airlines, transport infrastructure, and nonprofit organizations. Prominent operations disrupted Microsoft services, Kenyan government and internet infrastructure, and Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, where an attack caused emergency patients to be redirected to other facilities. The group operated the Distributed Cloud Attack Tool, also marketed as Godzilla, Skynet, and InfraShutdown. Its infrastructure used rented cloud servers, open proxies, and misconfigured servers to relay attack traffic rather than relying exclusively on compromised-device botnets. Its techniques included application-layer attacks against API endpoints and methods designed to bypass DDoS mitigation. Anonymous Sudan advertised attacks through Telegram and demanded payments from some victims to stop ongoing disruption, including a publicly issued ransom demand against Archive of Our Own. Anonymous Sudan framed campaigns as defending Islam and Sudan, supporting Palestinians, or retaliating against organizations and countries it considered hostile. It publicly associated with the pro-Russian Killnet collective in February 2023 and expressed support for the Kremlin. These associations do not establish Russian state control. Its claimed connection to the broader Anonymous movement was disavowed by mainstream Anonymous groups. In March 2024, U.S. authorities disrupted its attack infrastructure. An indictment subsequently charged Sudanese brothers Ahmed Salah Yousif Omer and Alaa Salah Yusuuf Omer with operating the group. U.S. authorities attributed more than 35,000 DDoS attacks and over $10 million in U.S. victim damages to its platform. The defendants' alleged roles remain criminal allegations rather than established convictions.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
9 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducted or claimed high-profile attacks against Israeli government and media targets and was cited as collaborating with SiegedSec on claimed DoS attacks against Israeli ICS and infrastructure.
Hacktivist group claiming DDoS-style disruptions against Israeli and Kenyan targets in response to geopolitical positions related to Israel.
Hacktivist-branded activity; described as distinct from the original 'OpSudan' and collaborating with Killnet against Western targets, illustrating blurred lines between hacktivism and state-aligned activity.
Mentioned as part of a list of proliferating hacktivist names; no specific operations described in this content.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.