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ChamelGang, also known as CamoFei, is a China-nexus advanced persistent threat group whose activities include cyberespionage, data theft, ransomware deployment, and denial-of-service attacks. Its activity dates to at least 2019, and it has been tracked under the ChamelGang name since March 2021. Targets include government institutions, energy companies, aviation organizations, and healthcare institutions. Early documented operations focused on Russian energy and aviation organizations, with additional compromises across Asia, Europe, and the Americas. China-linked attribution does not establish a specific government sponsor. The group gains initial access by exploiting public-facing applications, including JBoss Application Server and Microsoft Exchange Server. Documented exploitation includes CVE-2017-12149 and the ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities. In a Russian energy-sector intrusion, ChamelGang compromised a subsidiary and used that access to penetrate the parent organization's network, move laterally, collect information, and exfiltrate data. It has used DLL hijacking involving the Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service to establish persistence and escalate privileges. ChamelGang's toolkit includes Cobalt Strike Beacon, Tiny Shell, FRP, ProxyT, BeaconLoader, and the DoorMe backdoor. DoorMe provides covert access through compromised web-server infrastructure, while BeaconLoader supports deployment of additional malware within victim networks. The group disguises its infrastructure and malware by impersonating established technology vendors and using misleading certificates and service identities. It stages collected information on compromised web servers before retrieving it. ChamelGang is associated with CatB ransomware, including the 2022 ransomware incidents affecting Brazil's Presidency and the All India Institute of Medical Sciences. Its operations combine espionage with encryption-based attacks, and ransomware use has served financial gain, disruption, distraction, misattribution, and evidence removal. Later Warlock-related activity tracked as Longlegs or Storm-2603 has been linked to historical ChamelGang and CamoFei activity, but those connections do not establish that every operation attributed to those clusters belongs to ChamelGang.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
6 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
10 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
5 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
Attackers compromised a subsidiary company's web application on the JBoss Application Server and exploited CVE-2017-12149 to remotely execute commands on the host.
Attackers often used ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server against victims.
ChamelGang used a known chain of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange called ProxyShell—CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207—to compromise network nodes and gain a foothold.
ChamelGang used a known chain of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange called ProxyShell—CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207—to compromise network nodes and gain a foothold.
ChamelGang used a known chain of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange called ProxyShell—CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207—to compromise network nodes and gain a foothold.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
7 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An earlier activity cluster linked by Symantec to Longlegs. Mentioned as historical attribution context, without cluster-specific details about the current attacks or an explicit identification as a Longlegs alias.
An older activity cluster mentioned for similarities to Warlock. No direct involvement in the reported campaign or specific operational details are provided.
Named as a cluster historically associated with Longlegs. The content does not establish that it is an alias or subgroup, or attribute specific activity in the reported intrusions to it.
Mentioned as an older China-nexus activity cluster connected to Longlegs. The reference provides no separate operational details and does not explicitly identify ChamelGang as an alias or subgroup of Longlegs.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.