OldGremlin, also known as OldGremlins and TinyScouts, is a Russian-speaking, financially motivated cybercriminal group active since at least spring 2020. It conducts ransomware attacks against Russian organizations, including industrial and manufacturing enterprises, logistics providers, banks, insurers, retailers, real estate companies, software developers, healthcare organizations, and an arms manufacturer. Sixteen campaigns were attributed to the group through 2022, and renewed phishing and extortion activity targeted Russian industrial enterprises in early 2025. Reported ransom demands have reached $16.9 million. The group uses carefully prepared phishing emails that impersonate established businesses, media organizations, and professional associations. Links and attachments deliver custom backdoors and downloaders, including TinyPosh, TinyNode, TinyShell, and TinyFluff. Its tooling incorporates PowerShell and Node.js, while Cobalt Strike and TeamViewer support post-compromise operations. OldGremlin conducts network reconnaissance, steals administrator credentials, escalates privileges, establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry-based mechanisms, and moves laterally using RDP and SMB. Observed privilege-escalation techniques include exploitation of Cisco AnyConnect vulnerabilities CVE-2020-3153 and CVE-2020-3433. OldGremlin typically spends weeks inside compromised networks before deploying ransomware; its reported average dwell time is 49 days. It deletes backups and uses TinyKiller to disable antivirus processes through bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver attacks. Its TinyIsolator utility disables network adapters before encryption. The group deploys the .NET-based TinyCrypt ransomware, also referred to as TinyCryptor, and possesses a Go-based Linux variant. Linux attacks include clearing shell history, changing account passwords, and disabling SSH to impede recovery and access. Although OldGremlin has exfiltrated victim data, its documented extortion model has not relied on double extortion.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
20 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
12 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
7 additional families tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
Upon gaining an initial foothold, OldGremlin moves to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks, gaining elevated privileges using Cobalt Stroke, and even flaws in Cisco AnyConnect (CVE-2020-3153 and CVE-2020-3433).
Upon gaining an initial foothold, OldGremlin moves to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks, gaining elevated privileges using Cobalt Stroke, and even flaws in Cisco AnyConnect (CVE-2020-3153 and CVE-2020-3433).
27 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware attacks, including a high-value attack against Russian logistics company Sotrans.
Conducting multistage targeted ransomware and spearphishing attacks against Russian organizations, including banks, industrial enterprises, medical organizations, and software developers, using custom malware and post-exploitation tooling before deploying ransomware.
OldGremlin is conducting extortion attacks against Russian industrial enterprises using phishing emails, BYOVD techniques to disable security solutions, and legitimate Node.js interpreter for malicious script execution.
OldGremlins is a ransomware group that has resurfaced and is conducting new attacks targeting Russian companies.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.