Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon is a cyberespionage threat actor tracked by SentinelLABS that has operated since at least 2013. It primarily targets government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Southeast Asia and Australia, including activity affecting Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. SentinelLABS assesses its primary motive as espionage and assesses with moderate confidence that it is a small Chinese-speaking team. SentinelLABS also noted a potential association with UNC94 based on overlapping targeting, malware artifacts, infrastructure, and Chinese-language development traces. The actor has used multiple user-execution and spearphishing-style lures, including weaponized Microsoft Word documents, fake antivirus executables, fake folder or external-drive themed files, and removable-media shortcut lures. Reported exploitation includes CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 in weaponized Word documents. From 2018 onward, it used fake removable-device lures and USB shortcut techniques, including a shortcut impersonating a removable disk that launched an "Evernote Tray Application" to trigger DLL hijacking. Aoqin Dragon relies heavily on DLL hijacking, process injection, obfuscation, and persistence. Its loader used DLL hijacking to load a malicious encrashrep.dll component as explorer.exe, decrypted payloads, and injected a backdoor into rundll32.exe memory. It established persistence via autostart values such as EverNoteTrayUService or EverNoteTrayService after copying modules into %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\EverNoteService. The group has also used the Themida packer to obfuscate payloads. The actor is associated with the Mongall backdoor and a modified version of the open-source Heyoka tool. Mongall has been used by the group since 2013 and supports remote shell access, file upload, and file download, communicating over HTTP GET with data encoded or encrypted using base64, modified base64, or RC4 depending on the variant. Aoqin Dragon also obtained and modified the open-source Heyoka project for its operations; the modified backdoor added hardcoded command-and-control servers, checked whether it was running as a system service, and supported shell access, file operations, process management, and host discovery. Additional observed behavior includes scripts to identify file formats including Microsoft Word, use of rar commands in droppers to archive targeted document types such as .doc and .docx, and use of a spreader component named "upan" to copy malicious modules to removable devices for propagation. Debug strings and PDB paths contained Simplified Chinese text and references including DLL_test, upan, Mongall, and DnsControl. Known aliases and related tracking in the provided content: aoqin_dragon; potential association with UNC94.
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Tradecraft
41 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Associated vulnerabilities
4 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 4 of them exploited in the wild.
During 2012 to 2015, Aoqin Dragon relied heavily on CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 to compromise their targets.
During 2012 to 2015, Aoqin Dragon relied heavily on CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 to compromise their targets.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
They were also aware that another malicious script had been injected into the same website in November 2014, leveraging CVE-2014-6332 to download a trojan horse to the target’s host.
Observables
242 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the malicious file execution technique detected by this analytic.
Listed in the detection annotations as a threat actor associated with EFI volume mounting / installation-related behavior.
Referenced as a threat actor associated with spearphishing attachment activity involving malicious file execution and potential credential capture via UDL files.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the remote image load detection analytic; no actor-specific activity details are provided.
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Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.