SparklingGoblin is a China-aligned espionage threat actor associated with the broader Winnti ecosystem and linked by multiple researchers to activity also tracked as Grayfly, GREF, and Wicked Panda. The group has operated since at least 2020 and is known for sustained intrusions against organizations in East and Southeast Asia as well as selected targets globally. Reported victims include universities and other academic institutions, government entities, telecommunications organizations, media companies, information technology and electronics firms, financial organizations, religious and nonprofit entities, and commercial enterprises. SparklingGoblin is best known for using the modular SideWalk backdoor, including both Windows and Linux variants, and for overlaps with the older CROSSWALK or Motnug malware lineage. The actor has also been associated with ShadowPad, Korplug (PlugX), Cobalt Strike, custom loaders, web shells, and credential-dumping tooling including Mimikatz variants. SideWalk supports modular post-compromise operations, victim fingerprinting, proxy-aware command and control, and encrypted communications, while observed Linux variants include modules for system information collection and scheduled command execution. Observed tradecraft centers on exploitation of public-facing services for initial access, especially exposed server applications, followed by web-shell deployment, execution of custom loaders, persistence through scheduled tasks, credential theft, and movement to additional systems. Reported techniques include process hollowing or related code injection, DLL side-loading in some related operations, use of legitimate utilities for execution, and long-term maintenance of access to key servers within victim environments. The group has demonstrated the ability to compromise both Windows and Linux systems and to conduct prolonged espionage-oriented intrusions. SparklingGoblin has been tied to campaigns against Hong Kong universities and other academic targets in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Canada; government and local-government organizations in Southeast Asia and Georgia; telecommunications targets in Taiwan, Vietnam, the United States, and Mexico; media organizations in India, Bahrain, and the United States; and additional victims in South Korea. Its activity profile, tooling, and victimology are consistent with state-aligned intelligence collection rather than financially motivated crime.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
9 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
7 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
2 additional families tracked in Mallory.
21 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Threat actor name used by ESET in an alternative attribution of the Sidewalk backdoor.
China-aligned threat actor referenced as a known user of ShadowPad.
SparklingGoblin is known for exploiting widely known vulnerabilities, including those in the 2022 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities list. They are opportunistic and target unpatched systems using public exploits.
Conducting long-term intrusions using the SideWalk/CROSSWALK toolset and other implants, including attacks against a Hong Kong university and broader targeting across East and Southeast Asia with a particular focus on academia.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.