Storm-2477 is the Microsoft-tracked threat actor responsible for the development, maintenance, and operation of the Lumma Stealer malware ecosystem, including its command-and-control infrastructure and malware-as-a-service offering. The actor is associated with the Russia-based alias Shamel and with the Lumma and LummaC2 branding used to market the service on Russian-speaking cybercrime forums since 2022. Storm-2477 underpins one of the most prominent criminal infostealer platforms of the mid-2020s. Rather than operating solely as a single intrusion set, the actor maintains a service used by affiliates who generate customized builds and manage stolen data through a centralized panel. Lumma has been used by a broad range of financially motivated cybercriminals and has also appeared in campaigns linked to ransomware actors for initial access. The Lumma ecosystem supported by Storm-2477 is distributed through multiple delivery channels, including phishing, malvertising, trojanized and pirated software, compromised websites, fake CAPTCHA and ClickFix social-engineering lures, and secondary delivery by other malware loaders and botnets. Observed campaigns have included brand impersonation, invoice and booking-themed lures, abuse of public code repositories and trusted platforms, and drive-by delivery chains using clipboard-injected commands executed through Windows utilities such as PowerShell and mshta. Technically, Storm-2477’s malware has shown sustained development and increasing sophistication. Lumma employs advanced obfuscation and anti-analysis measures, including control-flow obfuscation, stack decryption, dead-code insertion, anti-sandbox checks, and low-level execution techniques. It has been observed using HTTPS for exfiltration, resilient multi-tier command-and-control with fallback channels, abuse of legitimate platforms for redundancy, and persistence mechanisms including registry-based autorun entries. The malware is capable of stealing browser credentials, session cookies, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallet material, financial data, application data, host metadata, and other sensitive information, and can also support delivery of additional payloads. Observed execution chains have included DLL side-loading and in-memory loader activity. Storm-2477’s Lumma service has affected victims globally and has been used against organizations and individuals across sectors including manufacturing, telecommunications, logistics, finance, healthcare, information technology, media, and government-related targets. Reported targeting includes campaigns against organizations in Canada and victims in South Korea, as well as substantial victimization in the United States and Europe. In May 2025, an international disruption operation involving Microsoft, law enforcement, and international partners targeted Lumma infrastructure and resulted in the seizure, suspension, or blocking of roughly 2,300 malicious domains. Despite that action, Lumma activity subsequently rebounded, reinforcing Storm-2477’s significance as a financially motivated cybercrime actor centered on large-scale credential theft, session hijacking, and data exfiltration.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
20 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
68 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Core developer/operator behind the Lumma malware-as-a-service ecosystem, maintaining and renting the infostealer to affiliates for credential, cookie, and data theft.
Tracked by Microsoft as the developer/operator behind LummaStealer and its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure; associated with the MaaS infostealer ecosystem that enables credential theft and follow-on malware delivery via affiliates.
Tracked as the developer/maintainer behind Lumma Stealer and its infrastructure, operating the malware-as-a-service ecosystem around Lumma.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
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Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.