Chimera
Chimera, also referred to in the content as APT Chimera, is a possible China-sponsored threat actor that CyCraft observed targeting Taiwan’s semiconductor industry in a year-long 2019 campaign. CyCraft also noted that highly malicious April 2020 intrusions against multiple Taiwan government agencies used techniques similar to APT Chimera, but stated that available evidence did not support direct attribution. The similarities suggested that China-based APT groups may share malware, tools, or techniques. Observed Chimera tradecraft in the provided content includes PowerShell execution, Windows command shell and batch-script execution, and remote execution via WMIC. The actor conducted discovery using file and directory listings, tasklist, quser, net user /dom, net user Administrator, ipconfig, ping, tracert, and registry queries including HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers and HKU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings. Chimera also used a bookmark-discovery path pattern targeting Citrix-related browser artifacts. For credential access and post-compromise operations, Chimera used custom DLLs for continuous retrieval of data from memory and obtained or used tools including BloodHound, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, PsExec, and the DSInternals PowerShell module. For command and control and exfiltration, Chimera used HTTPS communications and Cobalt Strike beacons, and staged stolen data both locally on compromised hosts and on designated servers in the victim environment. Defense-evasion behavior included renaming malware to GoogleUpdate.exe and WinRAR to names including jucheck.exe, RecordedTV.ms, teredo.tmp, update.exe, and msadcs1.exe; modifying DLL timestamps with a Windows version of the Linux touch command; and deleting files to evade detection.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇹🇼 Taiwan
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- CN
Tradecraft
51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
8 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 8 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
45 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
Referenced as a threat actor associated with the Network Share Discovery technique (T1135).
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.