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🇨🇳 CN8 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Chimera

Also known asChimera

Chimera, also referred to in the content as APT Chimera, is a possible China-sponsored threat actor that CyCraft observed targeting Taiwan’s semiconductor industry in a year-long 2019 campaign. CyCraft also noted that highly malicious April 2020 intrusions against multiple Taiwan government agencies used techniques similar to APT Chimera, but stated that available evidence did not support direct attribution. The similarities suggested that China-based APT groups may share malware, tools, or techniques. Observed Chimera tradecraft in the provided content includes PowerShell execution, Windows command shell and batch-script execution, and remote execution via WMIC. The actor conducted discovery using file and directory listings, tasklist, quser, net user /dom, net user Administrator, ipconfig, ping, tracert, and registry queries including HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers and HKU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings. Chimera also used a bookmark-discovery path pattern targeting Citrix-related browser artifacts. For credential access and post-compromise operations, Chimera used custom DLLs for continuous retrieval of data from memory and obtained or used tools including BloodHound, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, PsExec, and the DSInternals PowerShell module. For command and control and exfiltration, Chimera used HTTPS communications and Cobalt Strike beacons, and staged stolen data both locally on compromised hosts and on designated servers in the victim environment. Defense-evasion behavior included renaming malware to GoogleUpdate.exe and WinRAR to names including jucheck.exe, RecordedTV.ms, teredo.tmp, update.exe, and msadcs1.exe; modifying DLL timestamps with a Windows version of the Linux touch command; and deleting files to evade detection.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇹🇼 Taiwan

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

14 of 15 tactics75 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1595
Active Scanning
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002×2
Tool
T1608
Stage Capabilities
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002
Execution
6 techniques
T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×11
PowerShell
T1059.003×4
Windows Command Shell
T1129
Shared Modules
T1569
System Services
T1569.002
Service Execution
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1055
Process Injection
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1484
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001
Group Policy Modification
TA0005
Stealth
5 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.005
Indicator Removal from Tools
T1027.010
Command Obfuscation
T1055
Process Injection
T1070×2
Indicator Removal
T1070.001
Clear Windows Event Logs
T1070.004×2
File Deletion
T1070.006
Timestomp
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1484
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001
Group Policy Modification
TA0006
Credential Access
4 techniques
T1003×3
OS Credential Dumping
T1003.003
NTDS
T1110
Brute Force
T1110.003×2
Password Spraying
T1187
Forced Authentication
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001
Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
TA0007
Discovery
13 techniques
T1012×3
Query Registry
T1016×4
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1018×2
Remote System Discovery
T1033×4
System Owner/User Discovery
T1046×2
Network Service Discovery
T1057
Process Discovery
T1083×3
File and Directory Discovery
T1087×2
Account Discovery
T1087.002
Domain Account
T1120
Peripheral Device Discovery
T1124
System Time Discovery
T1135×2
Network Share Discovery
T1217
Browser Information Discovery
T1518
Software Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001×2
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002×3
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
TA0009
Collection
5 techniques
T1074×2
Data Staged
T1114
Email Collection
T1114.002×3
Remote Email Collection
T1119
Automated Collection
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001
Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×3
Web Protocols
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002×4
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

8 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 8 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2025-9491Microsoft Windows LNK File UI Misrepresentation Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence2

This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.

CVE-2021-31207Post-auth Arbitrary File Write in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell)In the wildEvidence1

This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

CVE-2021-34473ProxyShell pre-auth SSRF in Microsoft Exchange AutodiscoverIn the wildEvidence1

This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

CVE-2021-34523Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Backend Elevation of Privilege (ProxyShell)In the wildEvidence1

This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

CVE-2022-26134Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center OGNL Injection RCEIn the wildEvidence1

The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.

3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.

IOCS

Observables

45 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping51

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal8

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs8

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables45

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.