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Chimera is a China-linked intrusion set associated with cyber espionage activity, including operations targeting organizations in Taiwan. The group has demonstrated mature Windows post-compromise tradecraft centered on reconnaissance, staging, persistence, and data theft. Observed behavior includes extensive host and network discovery using native utilities to enumerate processes, logged-on users, system time, drive and shadow-copy information, local network configuration, and accessible network shares. Chimera has also used file and directory discovery to identify data of interest for collection. For execution and post-exploitation, Chimera has relied on the Windows command shell, batch scripts, and PowerShell, including use of the DSInternals PowerShell module to interact with Active Directory features. The group has remotely copied tools and malware to victim systems and has used scheduled tasks both to invoke Cobalt Strike and to maintain persistence. HTTPS has been used for command-and-control communications, and Cobalt Strike beacons have been used for data exfiltration. Chimera has also employed defense-evasion measures such as masquerading malware and utilities with names intended to resemble legitimate software, and has leveraged direct Windows system calls through Dumpert. Overall, Chimera’s observed tradecraft is consistent with a capable espionage-oriented actor focused on stealthy access, internal reconnaissance, persistence, and theft of information.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
10 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
5 additional families tracked in Mallory.
8 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 8 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
54 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned in passing as a ransomware operation that has run an affiliate program.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the ATT&CK technique/detection annotation for automated collection using Windows dir piped to findstr.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the generic discovery technique of running the Linux id command.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.