UNC5221
UNC5221 is a suspected China-nexus, Chinese state-sponsored espionage threat actor also tracked as UTA0178, VerdantBamboo, and WARP PANDA. The content notes that UNC5221 has sometimes been used synonymously with Silk Typhoon, but Google Threat Intelligence Group does not currently consider related clusters such as UNC6201 and UNC5221 to be the same, and the content also states UNC5221 is often reported as the same as Silk Typhoon while some researchers do not believe they are the same. The actor is associated with long-running espionage intrusions targeting U.S. law firms, technology organizations, government and IT sector organizations, Microsoft 365 environments, and defense and aerospace-related entities. Reported objectives in the content include theft of sensitive legal, trade, national security, and source code information, as well as broader geopolitical espionage, access operations, and intellectual property theft. UNC5221 is repeatedly described as favoring edge-device and appliance exploitation for initial access, including firewalls, VPN gateways, storage appliances, NAS systems, VMware infrastructure, and other systems that often lack EDR visibility. The content states the group exploited Ivanti products, including Ivanti Connect Secure, and exploited CVE-2025-22457 in the wild. The content also states advanced threat actors including UNC5221 exploited CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428, and that UNC5221 exploited two separate zero-day vulnerabilities in the same VPN product over a three-month period. In one December 2023 Ivanti zero-day incident, the domain symantke[.]com was found to be used by UNC5221. The content also links UNC5221 to use of the MOONSHINE exploit kit and to the SPAWN toolset targeting Ivanti VPN appliances. Malware and tooling directly linked to UNC5221 in the content include BRICKSTORM, PLENET, AGENTPSD, PhiliKit, LIGHTWIRE, THINSPOOL, WARPWIRE, WIREFIRE, ZIPLINE, TRAILBLAZE, BRUSHFIRE, and components of the SPAWN malware ecosystem. BRICKSTORM is described as a stealthy backdoor used across VMware hypervisor, Windows, Linux, BSD, Egnyte, and pfSense environments, with capabilities including SOCKS4/5 and HTTP proxying, file and directory operations, and interactive shell execution, and using WebSockets for command and control. Early BRICKSTORM variants were written in Go and newer variants in Rust. PLENET is described as a .NET backdoor compiled with Native Ahead-of-Time compilation that uses WebSockets and supports interactive shell, file operations, and C2 switching. AGENTPSD is described as a Python-based reverse shell used as a fallback implant. PhiliKit is described as a passive backdoor for executing shell, Python, and Perl scripts and is assessed to be part of UNC5221's SPAWN toolset. Mandiant also linked UNC5221 to custom malware families including LIGHTWIRE, THINSPOOL, WARPWIRE, WIREFIRE, and ZIPLINE. The content describes UNC5221 maintaining long dwell times and persistent access, including access lasting over a year and, in other reporting, at least 18 months. Tradecraft described in the content includes use of valid credentials, in-memory malware to reduce disk artifacts, command-and-control tunneling through legitimate third-party services, proxying traffic through compromised edge devices to make Microsoft 365 logins appear to originate from trusted internal infrastructure, modifying appliance startup files for persistence, re-entering environments after remediation using previously harvested credentials, and targeting infrastructure and appliances that are often excluded from traditional security monitoring.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Capital Goods
- Military
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- CN
Tradecraft
44 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
33 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
28 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
14 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 14 of them exploited in the wild.
This is an Ivanti exploit, possibly for CVE-2025-0282, CVE-2025-0283, or CVE-2025-22457 and the payload installs a backdoor. Mandiant recently discovered the payload in the wild. They attribute the activity to UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor.
CVE-2025-22457: Stack-based buffer overflow in Connect Secure, exploited by UNC5221
CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the web component of Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS), previously known as Pulse Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass control checks and access restricted resources.
CVE-2024-21887 is a command injection vulnerability in the web component of Ivanti ICS and Policy Secure that can be abused to execute arbitrary commands by an authenticated user.
Dell 0-Day Vulnerability A critical zero-day exploitation campaign targeting Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-22769, carries a maximum CVSSv3.1 score of 10.0 and has been under active exploitation since at least mid-2024.
9 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
114 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
China-nexus espionage actor associated with BRICKSTORM intrusions targeting VMware hypervisor and Windows environments in government and IT organizations for long-term persistence and lateral movement.
Cyber-espionage campaign targeting U.S. law firms and technology organizations to steal sensitive legal, trade, and national security information, using zero-day exploitation and long-term persistence.
Chinese state-sponsored espionage group conducting long-dwell intrusions by compromising edge infrastructure and MSP environments, maintaining access through appliances such as Egnyte Storage Sync, pfSense firewalls, and Synology NAS devices, and using multiple backdoors and proxy implants to bypass controls like Microsoft 365 Conditional Access.
Chinese espionage activity involving long-term intrusions into Microsoft 365 and victim networks, compromise of an MSP, use of Brickstorm, Plenet, and AgentPSD, and exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in edge devices since at least 2023.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.