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🇨🇳 CN33 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

UNC5221

Also known asUNC5221UTA0178

UNC5221 is a suspected China-nexus, Chinese state-sponsored espionage threat actor also tracked as UTA0178, VerdantBamboo, and WARP PANDA. The content notes that UNC5221 has sometimes been used synonymously with Silk Typhoon, but Google Threat Intelligence Group does not currently consider related clusters such as UNC6201 and UNC5221 to be the same, and the content also states UNC5221 is often reported as the same as Silk Typhoon while some researchers do not believe they are the same. The actor is associated with long-running espionage intrusions targeting U.S. law firms, technology organizations, government and IT sector organizations, Microsoft 365 environments, and defense and aerospace-related entities. Reported objectives in the content include theft of sensitive legal, trade, national security, and source code information, as well as broader geopolitical espionage, access operations, and intellectual property theft. UNC5221 is repeatedly described as favoring edge-device and appliance exploitation for initial access, including firewalls, VPN gateways, storage appliances, NAS systems, VMware infrastructure, and other systems that often lack EDR visibility. The content states the group exploited Ivanti products, including Ivanti Connect Secure, and exploited CVE-2025-22457 in the wild. The content also states advanced threat actors including UNC5221 exploited CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428, and that UNC5221 exploited two separate zero-day vulnerabilities in the same VPN product over a three-month period. In one December 2023 Ivanti zero-day incident, the domain symantke[.]com was found to be used by UNC5221. The content also links UNC5221 to use of the MOONSHINE exploit kit and to the SPAWN toolset targeting Ivanti VPN appliances. Malware and tooling directly linked to UNC5221 in the content include BRICKSTORM, PLENET, AGENTPSD, PhiliKit, LIGHTWIRE, THINSPOOL, WARPWIRE, WIREFIRE, ZIPLINE, TRAILBLAZE, BRUSHFIRE, and components of the SPAWN malware ecosystem. BRICKSTORM is described as a stealthy backdoor used across VMware hypervisor, Windows, Linux, BSD, Egnyte, and pfSense environments, with capabilities including SOCKS4/5 and HTTP proxying, file and directory operations, and interactive shell execution, and using WebSockets for command and control. Early BRICKSTORM variants were written in Go and newer variants in Rust. PLENET is described as a .NET backdoor compiled with Native Ahead-of-Time compilation that uses WebSockets and supports interactive shell, file operations, and C2 switching. AGENTPSD is described as a Python-based reverse shell used as a fallback implant. PhiliKit is described as a passive backdoor for executing shell, Python, and Perl scripts and is assessed to be part of UNC5221's SPAWN toolset. Mandiant also linked UNC5221 to custom malware families including LIGHTWIRE, THINSPOOL, WARPWIRE, WIREFIRE, and ZIPLINE. The content describes UNC5221 maintaining long dwell times and persistent access, including access lasting over a year and, in other reporting, at least 18 months. Tradecraft described in the content includes use of valid credentials, in-memory malware to reduce disk artifacts, command-and-control tunneling through legitimate third-party services, proxying traffic through compromised edge devices to make Microsoft 365 logins appear to originate from trusted internal infrastructure, modifying appliance startup files for persistence, re-entering environments after remediation using previously harvested credentials, and targeting infrastructure and appliances that are often excluded from traditional security monitoring.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Capital Goods
  • Military

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

44 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics58 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1592
Gather Victim Host Information
TA0001
Initial Access
4 techniques
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
T1133×3
External Remote Services
T1190×16
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003×2
Cron
T1059×5
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1059.004×2
Unix Shell
T1203×2
Exploitation for Client Execution
TA0003
Persistence
7 techniques
T1037
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003×2
Cron
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
T1133×3
External Remote Services
T1505
Server Software Component
T1505.003×4
Web Shell
T1543×2
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.002
Systemd Service
T1556×2
Modify Authentication Process
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
6 techniques
T1037
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003×2
Cron
T1068×5
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
T1543×2
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.002
Systemd Service
T1548
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
T1548.003×3
Sudo and Sudo Caching
TA0005
Stealth
5 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036
Masquerading
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.001
Clear Windows Event Logs
T1070.004
File Deletion
T1078×5
Valid Accounts
T1620×3
Reflective Code Loading
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1556×2
Modify Authentication Process
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1556×2
Modify Authentication Process
T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.004×2
SSH
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
6 techniques
T1071×3
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×3
Web Protocols
T1071.004×2
DNS
T1090×4
Proxy
T1090.001
Internal Proxy
T1090.002
External Proxy
T1105×5
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
T1568×2
Dynamic Resolution
T1573
Encrypted Channel
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

14 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 14 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2025-0282Unauthenticated RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTA GatewayIn the wildEvidence8

This is an Ivanti exploit, possibly for CVE-2025-0282, CVE-2025-0283, or CVE-2025-22457 and the payload installs a backdoor. Mandiant recently discovered the payload in the wild. They attribute the activity to UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor.

CVE-2025-22457Remote Code Execution in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA GatewaysIn the wildEvidence8

CVE-2025-22457: Stack-based buffer overflow in Connect Secure, exploited by UNC5221

CVE-2023-46805Authentication Bypass in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Web ComponentIn the wildEvidence5

CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the web component of Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS), previously known as Pulse Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass control checks and access restricted resources.

CVE-2024-21887Command Injection in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Web ComponentsIn the wildEvidence5

CVE-2024-21887 is a command injection vulnerability in the web component of Ivanti ICS and Policy Secure that can be abused to execute arbitrary commands by an authenticated user.

CVE-2026-22769Hardcoded Tomcat Manager Credentials in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual MachinesIn the wildEvidence4

Dell 0-Day Vulnerability A critical zero-day exploitation campaign targeting Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-22769, carries a maximum CVSSv3.1 score of 10.0 and has been under active exploitation since at least mid-2024.

9 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.

IOCS

Observables

114 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping44

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal33

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs14

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables114

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.