APT31 is a China-linked cyber espionage threat actor tracked under numerous aliases including ZIRCONIUM, Judgment Panda, Judgement Panda, Violet Typhoon, TA412, Bronze Vinewood, Chameleon, Red Keres, and WebFans. Public reporting and law-enforcement actions have associated the group with the Chinese Ministry of State Security. The actor is known for long-term intelligence collection operations and infrastructure development in support of espionage. APT31 has targeted government and military organizations and has also been linked to operations involving network edge devices and routers used to build covert command-and-control and reconnaissance infrastructure. Reported activity includes campaigns against government agencies and military structures in Russia, as well as operations affecting entities in France through compromised network equipment. The group has also been associated with activity involving Korean organizations through use of the Rekoobe Linux backdoor. Tradecraft attributed to APT31 includes acquisition of domains for targeted operations, browser credential theft, host and user discovery, network and proxy configuration discovery, ingress tool transfer, command-shell execution, persistence via Registry Run keys, encrypted command-and-control, and exfiltration over cloud-backed channels. Observed procedures include stealing credentials from Chromium- and Internet Explorer-based browsers, collecting usernames, processor architecture, and system time from compromised hosts, enumerating proxy settings, downloading additional malicious files, and opening remote Windows command shells. APT31 has used AES-encrypted command-and-control communications and has exfiltrated collected files through Dropbox-based command-and-control. Reporting has also described a third-stage implant used by the group to send collected files through Dropbox. APT31 has been linked to the Rekoobe backdoor in Linux environments. Rekoobe is derived from Tiny SHell and supports file upload, file download, and reverse-shell command execution, reinforcing the group’s cross-platform post-compromise capability. Separate reporting has also described APT31 tradecraft involving compromised Pakedge, Cyberoam, and Cisco routers to support command-and-control and reconnaissance infrastructure. Overall, APT31 is best characterized as a mature Chinese state-linked espionage actor focused on stealthy access, victim profiling, credential collection, persistent footholds, and data theft rather than disruptive or financially motivated operations.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
41 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
29 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
24 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
On July 19, 2025, security researchers and enterprise defenders began tracking a large-scale exploitation campaign targeting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Servers (CVE-2025-53770). On July 19th, Microsoft confirmed that a zero day vulnerability impacting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Servers, dubbed “ToolShell”. CVE-2025-53770 has been added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on July 20, 2025.
Researchers also identified Linen Typhoon, Violet Typhoon, and Storm-2603 had in fact started using the two flaws (CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704) as zero-days, based on its investigation into ongoing attacks on SharePoint Servers. CVE-2025-49704 : Type: Unauthenticated File Upload Allows arbitrary .aspx files (webshells) to be written to accessible paths.
Researchers also identified Linen Typhoon, Violet Typhoon, and Storm-2603 had in fact started using the two flaws (CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704) as zero-days, based on its investigation into ongoing attacks on SharePoint Servers. CVE-2025-49706 : Type: XAML Deserialization Enables post-auth remote code execution (RCE).
CVE-2025-53771 : Type: Input Validation / Path Traversal Used to overwrite or plant files in sensitive directories, aiding persistence.
Resource 106, once decompressed, is a driver called hidsvc.sys. It is loaded into the kernel by invoking the EpMe exploit of CVE-2017-0005 (this is the very same exploit that had its logic find its way into the Jian exploit somehow).
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
260 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the generic installation exploitation analytic, but no campaign-specific activity is described in this reference.
A long-running cyber-espionage and IP theft operator that, according to the article, has adopted ORB networks as part of standard Chinese APT operational security.
Mentioned only as an annotation/tag associated with a privilege escalation detection.
Mentioned only as an annotated threat actor associated with the detection content; no campaign or activity by the group is described in this reference.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.